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ABSTRACT 
On December 1, 2000 a new administration took over the presidency of 
México. This event was especially anticipated because the new president, 
Vicente Fox, was coming from a different party than the PRI, the old official party.  
The arrival of President Fox brought important changes in the way of 
governing; with the moral obligation to be different, since the beginning of his 
administration one of the main goals was incline to pursue a more dynamic 
participation by Mexico in the political issues of the world. This was to be 
accomplished by taking up several measures that included enhancing economic 
trade with the United States and other nations, world summits in Mexico, 
improvement of human rights and others. Among those plans one attracted 
special attention when Mexico asked for a seat as a non-permanent member in 
the UN Security Council for the period 2002-2003 the third time in Mexican 
history. There were divided opinions on the subject because Mexico would be 
directly involved in UN decisions concerning internal situations of other countries, 
something that goes against the foreign policy principles of México. Eventually 
this discussion opened doors for other topics; one of them was the possibility of 
Mexico participating actively in peacekeeping operations by sending troops 
overseas; this initiated a biter debate in the political sphere. 
This study analyzes Mexican Foreign Policy and the historical perspective 
of the foreign principles stated in the Mexican Constitution’s article 89, followed 
by a discussion of their influence and interpretation in the political-military 
environment before and during the administration of President Fox. The study 
includes the analysis includes the new social and political scenario that México is 
facing in order to determine the odds and obstacles when dealing with military 
participation overseas. As México takes its place in the community of nations, the 
country’s leadership needs to search for possible options and test whether the 
new Mexican political apparatus has the flexibility to address current threats and 
requirements for international security. An analysis on the capabilities of the 
 vi
Mexican Armed Forces is also necessary in order to determine their capacity to 
execute multinational operations. Finally bring out the real benefits and/or risks 
from getting Mexico involved in these kinds of operations are identified. 
 vii
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This work analyzes the history of Mexican Foreign Policy and the Mexican 
Constitution in order to understand México’s contemporary position on 
international affairs. The study looks particularly at the changes in foreign policy 
since 2000 and the new attitude of the Mexican government towards international 
affairs, especially the question of the participation by Mexican Armed Forces in 
UN peacekeeping operations. This study demonstrates that the Mexican Armed 
Forces are eminently capable of overseas operations, particularly those involving 
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. 
The study also demonstrates that México has historically adopted a 
defensive and anti-interventionist posture, a consequence of number foreign 
interventions against Mexico in the past; it argues that this posture is no longer 
applicable in the contemporary context. Since 2000, the Mexican government 
has considered participating In UN peacekeeping operations. 
The main arguments against participation of Mexican military in UN 
peacekeeping operations are grounded in Article 89 of the Mexican Constitution, 
particularly the principle of non-intervention; however, the same article specifies 
that México showed support for “the struggle for peace and international 
security.” In light of this fact the Mexican Armed Forces are clearly 



























A. THE NEW VISION 
On July 2, 2000 México held presidential elections with an outcome that 
would have a powerful impact on the country’s future; it was not only the election 
itself which made a difference, but the political membership of the new elected 
President Vicente Fox; he was from the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN).1 It was 
the first time that an opposition party had reached the presidency, leaving behind 
71 years of single party rule by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).2 
The political system remained basically the same, but the newly elected 
administration had a “different view” about how the country should be run, and 
how to manage México’s international relations. 
At home many believed that the time had come for México to finally 
become a democratic country. Quoting Mexican journalist Carlos Luken: 
The 2000 presidential election was México's first truly democratic 
national contest in a century, and the victory of Vicente Fox… put 
an end to 71 years of oligarchic rule by the PRI.3  
The new administration was fully aware that the results of the elections 
would have a huge impact on the country, and on the way the world looks at 
México. Such a situation needed to be exploited to realize the projects that 
President Fox had in mind. 
An outward strategy brought numerous chiefs of state of the world to 
Mexican soil. It was one way to show the world that México had peacefully 
transited to democracy. These meetings were a perfect opportunity to secure a 
closer relationship with México’s allies and partners, particularly the United 
States. Among the first actions taken by the government was the emphasis given 
to México’s foreign policy, an issue of particular importance for this thesis. The 
plan to handle international relations for the next six years was stated in the 
                                            
1 National Action Party. 
2 Institutional Revolutionary Party. 
3 Carlos Luken. México’s democratic challenge—to develop a civil service. Mexidata.info. 
June 27, 2005. 
2 
National Development Plan 2001-2006.4 One of the five strategies included in 
this document planned to “intensify the participation and influence of México in 
multinational forums, performing a more active role in the design of the new 
international architecture.” With this, President Fox wanted to enhance México’s 
place in the international arena, as was further demonstrated by the decision to 
seek a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council (UNSC). 
This decision divided opinion in Mexico, but nevertheless it was 
considered a victory for the new administration. México served as a non-
permanent member for the period 2002-2003. Although this was not the first time 
that México occupied a seat in the UN Security Council it was the first time that 
México’s government had asked for a place; before 2002, México was part of the 
Security Council twice. The first time was in the early stages of the UN in 1946, 
possibly because México had collaborated very closely with the United States 
during the war, especially concerning economics, and there were fewer options 
at the time (51 members initially with 19 Latin American countries). The second 
time was in 1980 because the UN General Assembly couldn’t agree on the two 
(then) candidates, Cuba and Colombia, setting an all-time record of 154 rounds 
of voting; after three months, Mexico was put forward and was elected in the 
155th round. Nonetheless, some Mexican scholars and foreign policy experts 
were concerned about the involvement of México in the internal affairs of other 
countries, something contrary to the pillar principles of México’s foreign policy. 
Outside the country, the perception was that México was finally taking a long 
earned place in international forums.  
Without any doubt, President Fox was inclined towards a more active 
participation in international affairs, as it was emphasized at the 2001 annual 
meeting with Mexican ambassadors. Here the President stated:  
 
 
                                            
4 The National Development Plan represents México's main planning instrument and 
contains not only the government’s policies and principles but also its main objectives and 
strategies for each administration. 
3 
I believe that with the maturity that we reached today, we can 
emerge as an active player in the world, and participate in what is 
happening, whether we like it or not, whether it is favorable or not. 
We must play a clear role in the world.5 
At the beginning of the Fox administration, Jorge Castañeda took over the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was the architect of the new “active” strategy, and 
working closely with Mexico’s Ambassador to the UN, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, they 
were the tip of the arrow of Mexico’s new international policy, including more 
active participation in the UN affairs. Through what Castañeda called “foreign 
policy activism” he pressed for the non-permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council, which eventually opened other doors for opportunities to get involved in 
international affairs. México sent civilian observers to the electoral processes in 
El Salvador (2005), Haiti (2004-2005), and Ecuador (2001) as well as electoral 
trainers and advisors to Morocco and Algeria, both in 2005. 
Castañeda also ignited Mexican foreign policy with his controversial 
proposal to involve México directly in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), 
including the possibility of militarily participation. Unfortunately, Castañeda 
resigned in 2002, but his successor, Luis Ernesto Derbez, continued to pursue 
the idea. The world changed after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and cooperation to 
maintain international security became a necessity, not a choice. The Fox 
administration was taking big and fast steps, too fast, perhaps, for Mexican public 
opinion, which had no accurate information about peacekeeping operations and 
eventually responded to these changes with a general feeling of rejection. 
The common understanding before President Fox was that México was 
constitutionally impeded from direct involvement in other nation’s affairs. This is 
not quite precise, as explained later. At this point, it is worth noting that after the 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)6 in 1994, 
México started to change rapidly. A more open border set the scene for important 
                                            
5 Diario del Pueblo [on line]. Internet; accessed August 3, 2006; retrieved from 
http://spanish.peopledaily.com.cn/ spanish/200101/08/sp20010108_44933.html. Author’s 
translation. 
6 North American Free Trade Agreement. Signed between the United States, México and 
Canada and officially launched in January 1994. 
4 
economic growth, and an unavoidable increase in the level of integration with the 
United States and Canada. The Fox administration considered felt that the 
integration process should not be restricted to the economy; it should also 
include politics, and most importantly, international security, an area where states 
can show commitment. UN peacekeeping operations were considered a good 
vehicle for this purpose: by this means México could show its commitment to 
world affairs. 
Nevertheless, one of the first challenges for President Fox in this regard 
was the political opposition. México was now a much different country. The once 
“almighty” power exerted by the presidency before 2000 was severely 
diminished. The new president was not in charge anymore of “all” the political 
decisions; now it was the time for other political players to exercise influence. 
The Fox administration faced one of the most, if not the most, divided 
congresses in Mexican history. 
B. PERSPECTIVES AND OPINIONS 
The debate on the peacekeeping issue attracted diverse opinions in 
México: politicians, military officers, academics, and ordinary citizens. However, it 
was not an easy task to find people that truly knew what peacekeeping 
operations were, even in the congress. 
At first public opinion was against the idea of sending troops abroad; the 
view was that Mexican soldiers and sailors would go to fight a war that was not 
ours. This was due mainly to a generalized misperception of what peacekeeping 
operations really are. Also, many politicians and academics based their criticisms 
on Article 89 of the Constitution, regarding the foreign policy principles of non-
intervention, self-determination, and peaceful solutions. However, these 
principles were a “non-written rule” until 1986 when they were included in the 
constitution by President de la Madrid; and as we shall see, this article has been 
shown to be ambiguous in some parts and some times misunderstood after its 
inclusion in the constitution. Interpretations of the constitution have varied from 
one administration to another according to the mindset of the president 
concerned. 
5 
Nonetheless, interest in the topic spread among Mexican politicians who 
started to express concern about the issue. For instance, due to the fact that UN 
peacekeeping operations involved military personnel, it was thought that the 
most influential opinions should come from the military. On the one hand, 
General Ricardo Clemente Vega, Secretary of Defense, was reluctant to 
consider peacekeeping operations as a task for the Mexican Army or the Air 
Force7 as the topic is not even mentioned in the National Development Plan. On 
the other hand, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Marco Antonio Peyrot, 
restructured the navy creating two naval forces capable of participating in 
multinational peacekeeping operations.8 The contrasting opinions of the two most 
important military officers in the country were evident to all. 
Such a difference in opinions was due to the difficulty of interpretation. 
Was it the result of misinterpretations of President Fox’s policy? Perhaps it was a 
sign of resistance by the Secretary of Defense to adapt “old traditional doctrines” 
to the new reality. In México political traditions have always played a singular role 
in the mindset of government decision makers. In this particular case the 
rationale to oppose PKO was unveiled by the question, “Why send troops to 
peacekeeping operations now if we did not do it before?” The counterargument 
pointed to limitations imposed by the foreign policy principles as they were 
currently outlined. However, in spite of these principles, México is, and has been 
for a long time, an active financial contributor to the peacekeeping operations 
fund. 
                                            
7 The Mexican armed forces are organized in two different cabinet departments, or 
secretariats instead of the usual three found in most countries. The Secretariat of National 
Defense (Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional) is the largest and best funded. It includes the Army 
and the Air Force, the latter one as a subordinate entity. The second is the Secretariat of the 
Navy (Secretaria de Marina) which is smaller and includes surface, air and marine components. 
The heads of both departments hold cabinet positions and are full-rank officers - a four star 
general in the Army and a fleet Admiral in the Navy. The two components do not come under a 
single unified commander at any level below the President. That is to say, there is no Minister of 
Defense as the term is usually understood. Each minister serves in a dual capacity: as a full 
cabinet member reporting to the President, and as the operational commander of his force. 
Military of México. Internet; accessed September 1, 2006; retrieved from Answers.com.  
8 Plan Institucional de Desarrollo 2001-2006. Navy’s Institutional Development Plan 2001-
2006. 
6 
When these circumstances are put to closer examination, more questions 
arise. For instance, does México need to participate in PKO? What would be the 
costs and benefits of such an endeavor? Are the Mexican armed forces prepared 
to get involved in PKO? Perhaps the old idea that the Mexican Armed Forces are 
a “defensive” and not an “offensive” force will prevail to counter the call for more 
involvement in international security. Or perhaps the reluctance of government 
decision-makers is based on a fear of a loss of sovereignty with Mexican military 
involvement in international conflicts.  
This fear has been an important intangible restraint on the Mexican Armed 
Forces, which have been limited to internal matters focusing on fighting drug 
trafficking and conducting social labor and disaster relief. Hence any attempt to 
get involved in multinational exercises or joint operations overseas was a 
forbidden subject, until President Fox came to power in 2000. The topic is no 
longer a prohibited issue, and despite the reluctance and divisions among 
different actors, the subject remains on the table for debate. As the Fox 
administration is approaching its end, it is expected that México will follow a 
similar path in international affairs. The newly-elected president Felipe Calderon 
has stated that: “we will continue with the construction… and the presence of 
México as a Latin American leader, leaving behind ideological loads.”9 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Although the independence of México was gained in 1810 we Mexicans 
consider ourselves to be a nation that has existed for centuries, heirs of old and 
rich cultures. Regardless of the roots of Mexican nationalism, the roots of 
Mexican foreign policy principles are less debatable and can readily be traced to 
the second half of nineteenth century after the war with the United States (1846-
1848) and the French Empire (1861-1867). 
However, the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) is particularly important 
because it was out of the revolution that the modern nation-state of México 
emerged. The contemporary Mexican Constitution was written in 1917 against  
 
                                            
9 El Universal newspaper [on line]. Internet; accessed September 8, 2006; retrieved from 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/noticias.html. 
7 
the backdrop of the revolution. As stated before the foreign policy principles were 
a non-written doctrine that was not included in the constitution’s Article 89 until 
1986. 
Article 89: the powers and obligations of the president are the 
following: (Amended by decree published in the Federation Official 
Newspaper on October 25, 1993) 
Subtitle X: Direct foreign policy and conclude international treaties, 
and submit them to the approval of the Senate: In the conducting of 
this policy, the head of the Executive Power will observe the 
following standard principles: self-determination of peoples, non-
intervention, peaceful resolution of disputes, juridical equality of 
states, international cooperation for development, and the struggle 
for international peace and security. (Amended by decree published 
in the Federation Official Newspaper on May 11, 1988.10 
 
In 1929 the PRI was born and for the following 71 years the country 
remained under its political control: the basis of ts foreign policy was 
strengthened in 1930 by the so-called Estrada Doctrine,11 and this remained the 
guiding foreign policy doctrine down to the twenty-first century. 
The present work will be divided into three main parts. This chapter, 
Chapter I, has provided an introduction to the overall study. This is followed by a 
second chapter on the historical background to México’s foreign policy. The first 
part of Chapter II examines the evolution of the Mexican Constitution and the 
weight of history on domestic policy and foreign policy. The guiding model will be 
Joel Migdal’s12 concepts. An overview of the historical background will help 
explain some of the main decisions taken to maintain a distant attitude in relation 
to the world’s conflicts driving the country to a state of conformity regarding most 
international matters. This chapter also explains how the PRI’s influence as a 
hegemonic party managed to preserve the core principles during its permanency 
in power. Such an analysis will shed light on the reasons behind México’s 
decision not to commit troops for UN peacekeeping operations. 
                                            
10 Mexican Constitution as of 2002, translated by Ron Pamachena. Internet; accessed 
September 2, 2006; retrieved from 
http://www.historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?op=viewarticle&artid=93. 
11 This doctrine was established in 1930 by Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Genaro 
Estrada. 
12 Joel Migdal. Strong Societies and Weak States. 
8 
Chapter III explores the new political environment in México. This includes 
an overview of the new approaches of México’s foreign policy and a forecast for 
the coming years. A close view of the main domestic challenges (political 
opposition, legal constraints, adverse public opinion, etc.) for a military 
contribution to UN peacekeeping will provide a better picture of the real 
possibilities of México to become an active player in international security. In 
addition, an analysis of the evolution of the Mexican Constitution since 
independence is included to provide a historical perspective on the 
interpretations given to the core principles of Mexican foreign policy during the 
last decades. The present political context is summarized at the end of this 
chapter. This will help to understand how new democratic practices, such as 
transparency, human rights, gender equality, and accountability are transforming 
the decision-making process. Some of these democratic practices also provide 
support for the peacekeeping argument because they translate into the need for 
professionalism on the part of the Mexican military, and peacekeeping 
contingents must have high levels of professionalism. 
Chapter IV is dedicated to identifying capabilities, organizations, current 
situations, and roles of the Mexican Armed Forces pointing out that throughout 
history México has favored economic development over militarization and thus 
maintaining a low-cost military system. Different from most Latin American 
counterparts, the Mexican military has been loyal to civilian power, focusing on 
internal security, social labor and disaster relief. The Mexican Army, for example, 
is one of the few armies in the world that has developed strong capabilities in the 
war against drug traffic and disaster relief, and the Navy is the first responder in 
natural disasters on the coast line with excellent results in search and rescue 
operations. This situation explains why México has maintained, and still does, 
one of the lowest military budgets in Latin America. The chapter is aimed at 





Finally, Chapter V provides the conclusion to this work. This chapter 
compares the costs and benefits of the eventual involvement of México in UN 
peacekeeping in contrast to different options that would also contribute to 
international security, such as peacebuilding, peacemaking, and humanitarian 
assistance. 
México changed with the advent of democracy. Today the newly-elected 
President Felipe Calderon represents the continuity of Fox’s approach. The 
congress will also be renewed. It is important to examine whether the new 
political apparatus will have the flexibility and if it is able to reach consensus to 
effectively face the present threats to México’s national security, which is an 
extension of international security. In a highly interdependent world, isolationism 
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II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN 
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Today’s Mexican constitution is a document that has been modified, 
misused and ignored by national leaders. Nonetheless, México has been able to 
maintain a strong document to bond the country, and has gained respect from 
the rest of the world defending its policy on the right of nations to be independent 
and has disagreed with the use of force to impose another’s will on sovereign 
nations. Such an attitude caused México to establish a moderate and sometimes 
passive foreign policy trying to stay out of international problems. The reasons 
that México arrived at this stance towards international affairs can be found in the 
history of the country, where the bases of Mexican foreign policy were set in the 
formation of the Constitution. 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the evolution of the Mexican 
constitution in relation to the country’s foreign policy, and analyze the historical 
background of México that influenced policymakers, whose diplomacy was 
grounded in three main principles: non-intervention, self-determination and 
peaceful solution of conflicts. The nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
centuries were very significant for México. The early nineteenth century was lived 
in a permanent state of fear after independence, surviving a war with the United 
States, the loss of half of Mexican territory, innumerous internal revolts, and a 
French imperial occupation. These incidents combined to place very specific 
constraints on the Mexican government’s view of international relations, 
particularly concerning the United States.  
Whether either side likes it or not, geography has made the 
relationship between the United States and México the most 
important one for México and one of the most important, if not the 
most significant, for the United States.13 
Each one of the three foreign policy principles was a result of the country’s 
historical experience. They were solidified in the context of situations that directly 
                                            
13 S. A. Weintraub. Marriage of Convenience: Relations Between Mexico and the United 
States. Oxford University Press; New York. 1990. p. 3. 
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threatened Mexican sovereignty, and later implemented as part of the foundation 
of the long period of one-party rule in México. The principles became the guiding 
dogma in international affairs and were strictly followed, most of the time, by the 
government. However, we shall see that the use and misuse of the foreign policy 
principles has been a privilege only granted to the president resulting in 
inconsistencies and endangering the foreign relations of México. Although the 
principles were not officially stated in the constitution until 1988, they reflected 
the long-standing defensive posture of the country, being highly influential in 
every administration in México. 
A. THE STARTING POINT 
The roots of the Mexican constitution were established during the War for 
Independence (1810-1821). In particular they are to be found in two documents: 
Los Sentimientos de la Nación (The Nation’s Feelings), written by José María 
Morelos y Pavón14 (1813); and the Decreto Constitucional para la Libertad de la 
América Mexicana (Constitutional Decree for the Freedom of the Mexican 
America), also known as the Constitution of Apatzingán (1814). Written by the 
Congress of Apatzingán this latter document sought to establish the basis for the 
end of foreign dominance: 
The supreme Mexican congress, eager to fill the heroic sights of 
the nation, elevated nothing less than to the sublime objective to 
evade forever the foreign domination, and to replace the despotism 
of the Spanish monarchy…15 
The constitution of 1814 also enhanced the right to be sovereign and 




                                            
14 José María Morelos y Pavón (30 September 1765-22 December 1815) was one of the 
main leaders of Mexico's struggle for independence. 
15 Decreto Constitucional para la Libertad de la América Mexicana. As cited by the Instituto 
de Investigaciones Legislativas del Senado de la República (PILSEN). Principios Históricos de la 
Política Exterior Mexicana. Internet; accessed September 12, 2006; retrieved from 
http://www.senado.gob.mx/iilsen/docs/investigaciones1.html. 
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No nation has right to impede to another the free use of its 
sovereignty [non-intervention]. The conquest title cannot legitimize 
the acts of force: the people [nation] that tries it must be forced by 
the arms to respect the conventional right of the nations.16 
This text was the starting point to build up a republic based on liberal 
political institutions and respect for individual rights, but due to the struggle and 
instability of the late Spanish period never became an official document. 
However, those two sources had an important impact on the next constitution 
(1824) when the new congress wrote the Acta Constitutiva de la Federación 
Mexicana (Constituent Act of the Mexican Federation), the first official Federal 
Constitution of the United Mexican States, which established a federal system. 
The text included concepts from the United States constitution and was modeled 
around a central government with a division of powers into the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches. The text also gave power to the President and 
the Congress in foreign policy, giving the latter, as a whole, the final decision to 
approve any treaty or agreement: 
The president has the right to… 
Name the diplomatic envoys and consuls with approval from the 
Senate, and meanwhile this one settles down, from the present 
congress; and… 
To direct diplomatic negotiations, to celebrate treaties of peace, 
friendship, alliance, federation, truce, armed neutrality, commerce 
and others; but to lend or to deny its ratification to anyone of them, 
it will have to precede the approval of the General Congress.17 
The 1824 Constitution was abolished by President Antonio López de 
Santa Anna in 1833 establishing his personal charter known as Las Siete Leyes 
(The Seven Laws). The Seven Laws maintained basically the same arguments 
on foreign affairs but gave the president much more power in the final decision. 
The document was fully centralist regardless of the existence of a congress, 
which at the same time was powerless against the decisions of the executive. 
                                            
16 Decreto Constitucional para la Libertad de la América Mexicana. 
17 Acta Constitutiva de la Federación, decree of January 31, 1824. As cited by the Instituto 
de Investigaciones Legislativas del Senado de la República (IILSEN). 
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During this period Mexican foreign policy primarily responded to external 
intimidation and reflected the lack of internal stability and a diminished capacity 
to negotiate at the international level. 
B. THE ERA OF BENITO JUAREZ 
In 1855 Santa Anna went into exile, but before doing so México lost half of 
its territory to the United Sates during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848). 
This terrible experience is still remembered as an abusive act of power by the 
United States against a weak, defenseless and struggling México, and it would 
have an enormous affect upon the mindset of future decision-makers by 
encouraging an ongoing mistrust of the United States. After Santa Anna a new 
generation of liberals, most of them civilians arrived. At that time the congress 
elected President Ignacio Comonfort, and appointed Benito Juarez18 as 
president of the Supreme Court, who also acted as vice-president. Between 1855 
and 1857 Juárez worked with other legislators including Ignacio Ramírez, Miguel 
Lerdo de Tejada, Melchor Ocampo, José María Iglesias, and Francisco Zarco to 
write Las Leyes de Reforma (The Laws of Reform), preparing a new constitution 
issued on February 5, 1857. The new constitution and the inclusion of Leyes de 
Reforma had an enormous impact on the emerging new political order in Mexico 
for several reasons. As its first articles stated: 
The State and the Church are independent between them. The 
Congress can not dictate laws establishing or prohibiting any 
religion. Marriage is a civil contract; this and other acts concerning 
the civil status of people are of exclusive competence of the State. 
No religious institution can acquire real estates or taxes imposed 
upon them.19 
The text also reaffirmed the independent and federal character of the 
Republic suppressing any trace of the former centralist system. The new set of 
laws was the beginning of a new socio-political era for México. The document 
                                            
18 Benito Pablo Juárez García (March 21, 1806-July 18, 1872) was a Zapotec Indian who 
served two terms as President of México. For his resistance to French occupation and his efforts 
to modernize the country, Juárez is often regarded as México’s greatest and most beloved 
leader. He is the only full-blooded Indian to serve as president of México. 
19 RedEscolar.ilce.edu.mx. “Las Leyes de Reforma.” Internet; accessed September 10, 
2006; retrieved from 
http://redescolar.ilce.edu.mx/redescolar/efemerides/septiembre2001/conme25.htm. 
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was more detailed with regards to foreign policy, giving specific duties to each 
one of the chambers such as the Senate’s exclusive attribution to approve, or 
disapprove any diplomatic treaties or agreements with other countries; and to 
ratify, or not, the naming of ministers, diplomatic agents, consuls.20 The 1857 
constitution was reminiscent of the 1824 charter but was noteworthy for its 
introduction of major reform laws restricting military and clerical fueros 
(privileges) and clerical property rights. The new constitution also introduced a 
bill of rights, abolished slavery, and reestablished a strong national congress as a 
unicameral body.21 The restriction of clerical property rights made the Catholic 
Church react against the paper, finding support in some conservatives and 
initiating a three-year armed conflict known as La Guerra de Reforma (The War 
of Reform). Benito Juárez was put in jail along with other congressmen and the 
states of the union were divided between those in support of the constitutional 
order and those against it. The war ended in 1861 and Benito Juárez became 
president continuing to strengthen the Laws of Reform. However, one year later 
the French Empire invaded México proclaiming a Catholic Empire causing 
President Juárez and his forces to retreat to the north, while the Austrian 
archduke Maximilian von Habsburg was declared Emperor of México. 
With the American Civil War over the United States moved to help 
President Juárez and his forces. The American congress demanded the French 
withdraw from México and set up a naval blockade. The pressures and problems 
in Europe made Emperor Napoleon III withdraw in 1866; Maximilian was 
captured and executed in 1867 after court martial, disregarding pleas made by 
prominent European figures to spare his life. The message sent by President 
Juárez was that México would not accept any foreign government intervention in 
its internal affairs. The 1857 Constitution had been ignored during Maximilian’s 
rule and was reestablished after President Juárez returned to the nation’s capital. 
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Benito Juárez was re-elected president for the last time in 1871 and died the next 
year; he is most remembered by his quote about respecting others’ rights: “May 
the people and the government respect the rights of everyone. Among 
individuals, as among nations, respect for the rights of others is peace.”22 After 
Juárez’s death, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada assumed the presidency. During this 
term an important step in the Mexican foreign policy was taken, introducing the 
principle of self-determination in a diplomatic note sent by Mexican Foreign 
Minister Jose Maria Lafragua to the U.S. Ambassador John W. Foster. Minister 
Lafragua argued that any foreign citizen or corporation involved in economic 
activities in México should follow Mexican laws, and that any complaints should 
be addressed to the country’s tribunals. The argument was based on 
Argentinean jurist Carlos Calvo’s23 theory, known as The Calvo Doctrine of 1868, 
which specifies:  
[The] States [nations] are sovereign and have the right to be free 
from any form of interference from other states, and that any 
foreigner should follow the general principle that they are equal to 
nationals and have no special privileges; therefore, they have the 
same rights as nationals, and in case of disputes or reclamations 
will have the right to follow all the legal procedures using the local 
tribunals without asking [for] diplomatic protection or intervention 
from their home country.24 
This argument became a constitutional pillar for many Latin American 
countries and one of the most important Mexican foreign policy principles, 
reinforcing non-intervention in the building of a diplomatic shield against foreign 
invasions. 
When President Lerdo de Tejada announced he would run for re-election 
in 1876, José de la Cruz Porfirio Díaz, better known as Porfirio Díaz, took control 
of the country. Díaz had challenged Juárez at the polls in 1867 but did poorly                                             
22 Wikipedia.org. Benito Juárez Biography. Internet; accessed September 10, 2006; retrieved 
from http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benito_Ju%C3%A1rez.  
23 Francesco Tamburini. Historia y Destino de la “Doctrina Calvo” ¿Actualidad u 
obsolescencia del pensamiento de Carlos Calvo? Rev. estud. hist.-juríd. [online]; 2002, No.24, 
pp. 81-101; Internet; accessed October 17, 2006; retrieved from 
http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0716-54552002002400005 
&lng=en&nrm=iso>. ISSN 0716-5455.  
24 Ibid. 
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against a statesman who was at the height of his popularity, and tried again in 
1871, claiming that he lost through electoral fraud. Díaz’ ideological standard 
was, ironically, the principle of “no reelection” and claimed that Juárez was 
attempting to perpetuate himself in office, calling for a general uprising only to be 
routed by troops loyal to Juárez. Díaz not only lived to fight another day but this 
“advocate” against re-election would also live to impose a thirty-four year 
dictatorship on México.25 The foreign policy of Diaz was focused in four main 
goals: attract foreign investment (from the United States and Europe); diversify 
foreign relations reestablishing diplomatic relations with Italy (1869), Spain 
(1871), France (1880) and England (1884); influence U.S. public opinion and 
promote foreign immigration. Diaz was cautious, maintaining a flexible 
relationship with the United States and Europe. During the nineteenth century 
México accumulated twenty two years of wars including one with the United 
States, a French intervention, and multiple internal fights. The violent overthrow 
of governments and the perpetuation in office of powerful presidents were 
problems that plagued México throughout the nineteenth century and into the 
revolutionary period. 
C. THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1917, AND 
THE CARRANZA DOCTRINE 
“Madero has unleashed a tiger. Now let’s see if he can control it.”26 
Between 1910 and 1921 México would be involved in its most terrible internal 
war, the Mexican Revolution. The episode marked the country significantly 
providing the bases for modern México. The Revolution was not only the 
consequence of the thirty-four years dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. But also the 
preferences given to the aristocratic class and the mistreatment of the lower 
class; nevertheless, there was an imperative to change the regime and reclaim 
the democratic principles that were set out at the beginning of the independence 
period. In the words of James F. Engel: 
                                            
25 Throughout the thirty-four years the dictator maintained the sham of democracy. Elections 
were held periodically at the local, state and national levels, but they were invariably manipulated 
in favor of those candidates who held official favor. As cited by Meyer, 435. 
26 Famous quote made by Porfirio Diaz in 1911 on his way to Veracruz and ultimate exile. 
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The Mexican Revolution… was a genuine revolution, accomplishing 
deep and lasting changes in the social and political structure of the 
country. Latin America has a history of revolutions, but that in 
México is unique in its thorough effect on the totality of Mexican 
society.27 
Throughout the Revolution there were several important events that 
influenced the foreign policy of México and directly involved the United States. 
The first occurred on February 12, 1913 when General Victoriano Huerta met 
with Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Huerta 
received full support to impose a new regime overthrowing President Francisco I. 
Madero.28 During the meeting Wilson promised not to recognize the government 
of Madero, allowing Huerta to assume power. The resulting agreement came to 
be known as The Embassy Pact. After Madero was captured and forced to 
resign, Huerta asked Ambassador Wilson what he should do with Madero. 
Wilson replied that Huerta “ought to do what is best for the country,” which 
Huerta saw as a U.S. endorsement of his disposing of Madero as he wished. 
Wilson’s attitude was a classic manifestation of U.S. intervention in the internal 
affairs of México. Madero was subsequently killed by order of Huerta. 
Another intervention took place in 1914; in the middle of México’s internal 
struggle the United States invaded México. The invasion of the country brought 
back memories of the 1846 Mexican-American War, as described by Jorge 
Salaverry: 
President Woodrow Wilson dispatched a squadron to support the 
opponents of General Victoriano Huerta, who [with U.S. support 
illegally] seized the presidency in 1913. Wilson’s aim was to 
interdict a shipment of German weapons for the Huerta 
government. Wilson underestimated Mexican nationalism. Not only 
Huerta, but his opponent Venustiano Carranza, condemned the 
U.S. occupation as an intervention in México’s internal affairs... 
                                            
27 James F. Engel. The Revolution and Mexican Foreign Policy. JSTOR. Oct. 1969 [article 
online]; Vol. 11, No. 4; p. 520, Internet; accessed 26 September, 2006; retrieved from 
http://links.jstor.org.  
28 Francisco I. Madero (October 30, 1873-February 22, 1913) ran against Diaz during the 
election of 1910 who had promised a true democratic election. Madero won the elections as 
served as president from 1911 to 1913. However, once Diaz was deposed, the Mexican 
Revolution quickly spun out Madero’s control. Madero became the first democratic elected 
president after Diaz. 
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[This event] also gave Mexicans a new reason to resent the 
U.S.…The Revolution signaled the beginning of popular 
participation in government – a signal that Mexicans rather than 
foreigners must control the national destiny.29 
In 1916 U.S. President Wilson ordered the famous “Pershing Punitive 
Expedition” under the command of General John J. Pershing to capture 
Francisco “Pancho” Villa in response for the attack by Villistas on the small town 
of Columbus, New Mexico. “Little if any help could be expected from the rural 
Mexicans, and as the Americans entered small pueblos they were often greeted 
with shouts of ¡Viva México, Viva Villa!”30 Pancho Villa was never captured and 
the failure of the expedition, which was recalled to the US in January 1917, gave 
even more prestige to Villa. At the same time the writing of the 1917 Constitution, 
which has survived down today, was taking place in an attempt to legitimize the 
Revolution, Venustiano Carranza agreed to convoke a congress to meet in 
Querétaro for the purpose of drawing up a new constitution.31 The congress 
approved the new Constitution on February 5, 1917 with Venustiano Carranza as 
the first president. 
President Carranza made a statement in 1918 about the foreign policy 
principles of México declaring that the principles of Mexican foreign policy 
are few, clear and simple… All countries are equal, owing mutual 
and scrupulous respect to their institutions, their laws, and their 
sovereignty; that no country should intervene in any form or for any 
motive in the internal affairs of another. All should strictly maintain, 
and without exception, the universal principle of non-intervention… 
Nationals and foreigners should be equal before the sovereignty of 






                                            
29 Jorge Salaverry. “Evolution of Mexican Foreign Policy.” The Heritage Foundation’s Report. 
March 11, 1988 [journal online]; Internet; accessed September 22, 2006; retrieved from 
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pressure on the governments of weak countries, in order to obtain 
modification of laws which do not suit the citizens of powerful 
countries.32 
This statement is known as the “Carranza Doctrine” and clearly reflected 
the historical experience of México. It also revealed an obvious allusion to U.S. 
behavior and the importance of the principle of non-intervention. The 1917 
Constitution differed from its predecessor in several areas, chiefly taking care of 
national resources that attracted foreign interests by reducing external influence 
over the nation’s economy. The biggest threat to foreign investors was article 27, 
which stated that only the government had full rights over the nation’s natural 
resources, clearly restricting oil and mining exploitation. The Mexican leadership 
was well aware that the country was powerless, especially against the United 
States; and in order to make up for this weakness México needed to look for a 
better option than war. This reality led the country to the only choices available: 
international diplomacy and moral persuasion. From now on México would wield 
diplomacy and rational argument as its only tools in international relations.  
D. THE POST-REVOLUTION RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
In 1920 Carranza was assassinated, and the end of the Revolution was 
drawing near. Mexico initiated a slow process of reconstruction and pacification 
headed by a select caste of prestigious Revolutionary generals. Adolfo de la 
Huerta was the first provisional president of Mexico after the conflict; Alvaro 
Obregón who followed de la Huerta was re-elected in 1928 but was killed before 
taking office; and finally, Plutarco Elias Calles was elected president in 1924. 
Calles had the political vision that would allow the “revolutionary class” to stay in 
power permanently as Nora Hamilton says: “The [Mexican] revolution of 1910 
destroyed the pre-existing state apparatus and enabled the revolutionary 
leadership to form a new state.”33 
 
                                            
32 As cited by Engel, James. pp. 523-524. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Dirección 
General de Prensa y Publicidad. Algunos aspectos de la política internacional de la Revolución. 
México, 1960. 
33 N. Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary México. Princeton 
University Press; Princeton, New Jersey. 1982. p. 3. 
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Although the country was still wracked by political instability the base of 
power in the republic had shifted into new hands, and the country was finally on 
the threshold of better times.34 
1. The Initial Stages Implementing the Constitution 
President Alvaro Obregón was very cautious in his implementation of the 
Constitution of 1917. He was particularly concerned about the effects it would 
have on the ownership of property by foreigners; article 27 hung like a sword 
over the agricultural and oil properties of foreigners because it opened up the 
possibilities of their being expropriated or nationalized.35 In addition to the 
difficulties inherent  in nationalization there was a need to make sure that there 
would be no more interference from the United States or any other nation in 
México. However, since the beginning of Obregón’s administration, American 
businessmen had been urging the United States to become more active in the 
defense of their Mexican interests. Obregón’s administration and his policies 
were always overshadowed by the specter of U.S. intervention to protect the 
interest of its citizens who owned properties in México.36 A key element of U.S. 
pressure on the Mexican government in the post-revolutionary decade was the 
threat of non-recognition.37 In 1923 Obregón’s administration signed the Bucareli 
Agreements, allowing American oil companies to continue the exploitation. In 
exchange President Harding would extend diplomatic recognition. 
Between 1924 and 1934 México was effectively under the control of 
General Plutarco Elías Calles, Jefe Máximo (the Supreme Chief) and successor 
to Obregón. Calles was well known as both a liberal and a strong man, with 
radical tendencies.38 Relations with the United States were still centered on oil 
and in 1924 the relationship reached a difficult point, thanks to U.S. Ambassador 
James Sheffield who, regardless of the Bucareli Agreements, required from 
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President Calles further assurances that foreign property interests would be 
protected. Calles refused to go beyond the promises made in the Bucareli 
Agreements, and Sheffield started to bombard the U.S. State Department with 
‘red scare dispatches’. Then in 1925 US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg 
clarified the U.S. position in a statement to the press promising support to the 
Mexican government “only so long as it protects American lives and American 
rights and complies with its international obligations. The Government of México 
is now on trial before the world.”39 This kind of attitude was more than Calles 
could stand. He immediately expressed his strong displeasure with the 
statement, for it appeared that the United States was once again harboring 
aggressive designs, and he would never allow any nation to establish a 
privileged position for its nationals, rejecting outright the inherent threat to 
México’s sovereignty in the secretary’s pronouncement. Calles reinforced his 
statement, making the legislature enact a new petroleum law in December 1925 
which required all oil companies to apply to the government for a confirmation of 
their concessions to determine whether or not to grant the confirmations. As 
Calles began to enforce the new petroleum law, relations between México City 
and Washington reached the breaking point.40  
U.S.-Mexican relations were mired in an atmosphere of distrust, and in 
1927 Sheffield was replaced by Dwight Morrow. The new designation didn’t 
make any difference to Mexican government, which was convinced that the U.S. 
had sent another Wall Street representative to push for the oil companies, but the 
new ambassador turned out to be a pleasant surprise. Morrow’s political and 
personal behavior was very different than “standard Americans,” demonstrating a 
real interest in México, going shopping with his family in the open marketplaces, 
and he even began to study Spanish - not common for U.S. ambassadors in the 
1920s. President Calles and the ambassador began having breakfast together. 
The relaxed atmosphere enhanced their ability to discuss diplomatic problems 
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between their two countries.41 Morrow did not warn that México was on trial 
before the world; rather he told Calles that he believed the oil companies’ 
concerns should be settled in the Mexican courts, and indicated that he expected 
no special consideration for U.S. citizens. Calles was impressed and possibly 
used his influence to see that the courts rendered a compromise decision.42 The 
significance of this shift was clearly manifested in U.S. State Department’s official 
comment that: “the petroleum controversy had been resolved by the Mexican 
government without any interposition from the United States”. For the first time 
Washington had formally recognized México’s full legal sovereignty.43 At the 
same time México started to participate in international forums and conventions; 
these forums would provide México with a voice regarding international policy 
and non-intervention.  
In 1928 the shadow of US interventionism reappeared, during the Sixth 
Pan American Conference in Havana, when U.S. delegate for the Conference 
Charles Evans Hughes stated that he: “refused to accept the projected Treaty of 
States, because of the article prohibiting any state from interfering in the internal 
affairs of any other state.”44 México didn’t accept the policy of intervention and 
the conference was a failure. Meanwhile, in México the Constitution of 1917 had 
recently been amended to provide a six-year presidential term and the possibility 
of re-election, if it were not immediate.45  
E. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ESTRADA DOCTRINE (1930) 
In September 1930 the Mexican Foreign Minister, Genaro Estrada, 
proclaimed the Doctrina Estrada46 (Estrada Doctrine). It played an important role 
in Mexican foreign policy by dealing directly with the recognition policy. This was 
the first important statement made by the government stating that México would 
maintain a respectful attitude toward the nations of the world, particularly in Latin 
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America; in return México expected that kind of attitude from the rest of the 
world. México had been setting the pace for support of the principle of non-
intervention, encouraging the rest of Latin America to follow. The Estrada 
Doctrine specifically stated that México would no longer release any kind of 
statement regarding this issue, recognition, limiting its position to maintaining or 
withdrawing its diplomatic representation. As James Engel explains: 
The Estrada Doctrine, therefore, allowed México to avoid the 
problem of passing judgment on the government of another country 
and, by that step, interfering in its internal affairs. This doctrine and 
the principle of non-intervention that it implies, has been espoused 
by México since its proclamation as Mexican policy.47  
Nevertheless, the real message contained in the Estrada Doctrine was 
that México would no longer be frightened by the withdrawal of recognition by 
any country as had happened during Carranza and Obregón’s time, when 
diplomatic recognition became an instrument of pressure used by the United 
States and European countries. Under this premise and via the flag of non-
intervention México would continue working with the rest of Latin America to 
persuade the rest of the world of the significance of the principle. 
F. THE ERA OF LÁZARO CÁRDENAS AND THE OIL PROBLEM 
In 1934, many Mexicans were delighted with the election of General 
Lázaro Cárdenas to the presidency. Cárdenas was a nationalist-left wing leader 
who respected the revolutionary principles of land distribution, freedom, and no 
re-election, and was fully committed to fulfill twenty years of promises. Once in 
office Cárdenas determined that he was going to be free of Calles’ domination. 48 
In 1936 he ordered Calles arrest and sent him into exile with the order that he 
should never return. By the mid-1930s, México had developed a cadre of 
professional bureaucrats in the foreign relations and treasury ministries who were 
committed to national economic development rather than to any single chief 
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executive.49 Cárdenas came to the presidency at a time when a new, young 
generation of revolutionaries was beginning to displace the old veterans of the 
days of violence. 
1. The Petroleum Expropriation of 1938 and the Relations with 
the United States 
The Cárdenas administration faced the peak of the chronic oil problem 
with the United States in the year of 1938. The period was marked by several 
international events that were influential in Mexican foreign policy. The conditions 
prior to 1938 paved the way for Cárdenas in many forms with three main 
ingredients in play: the newly declared “good neighbor” policy on the part of the 
U.S., the relationship with the Mexican working class, and the international 
scene. Cárdenas was able to combine those elements in a series of high-level 
decisions to successfully accomplish the petroleum expropriation. The 
proclamation of the Good Neighbor Policy by U.S. President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt (1933-1945) in relation to Latin America was focused on hemispheric 
solidarity against external threats. In his first inaugural address on assuming the 
presidency (March 4, 1933), Roosevelt declared: 
In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy 
of the good neighbor -the neighbor who resolutely respects himself 
and, because, because he does so, respects the rights of others- 
the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity 
of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.50 
In accordance with Roosevelt’s policy the United States accepted the 
“Protocol of Non-Intervention on December, 1936 during the Inter American 
Conference on Maintenance of Peace, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina. This 
protocol declared that the American republics were against intervention in any 
form, be it direct or indirect, [and] was approved.”51 It was an outstanding 
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achievement for Mexican foreign policy. For the first time the United States 
recognized non-intervention as a universal principle. Two years later on March 
18, 1938 Cárdenas declared the expropriation of all the foreign oil companies 
operating in México. 
The decision shocked nationals and foreigners. The biggest problem was 
that it endangered relations with the United States and Great Britain; and indeed, 
London broke off diplomatic relations with México. The wave of protests 
provoked an immediate economic and diplomatic problem for México. In the 
U.S., President Roosevelt was highly criticized, arguing that his “good neighbor” 
policy had encouraged México to adopt an independent attitude that could not be 
tolerated. The most important signal of success for Cárdenas was given when 
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull recognized that the Mexican government had 
the right to expropriate foreign property in Mexico. 
President Cárdenas had not rolled the dice to decide what to do; he 
balanced the situation by taking into account all the facts. He knew that the 
United States would eventually support Great Britain in most any situation; he 
also knew that the expropriation was sanctioned by international law because it 
involved prompt and fair payment.52 However, he was confident that President 
Roosevelt would support his decision on the oil matter and that Roosevelt’s good 
neighbor policy would ensure that there would be no armed retaliation by the 
United States.  
G. THE PRI-GOVERNMENT CONSOLIDATION AND THE MEXICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
After the Mexican Revolution the revolutionary class intuitively understood 
that the use of a political party was the best option to legitimize the revolutionary 
principles, ensuring that they would remain intact and could be defended. In 1929 
the Partido Nacional Revolucionario53 (PNR) was created, led by General 
Plutarco Elias Calles. The PNR would become the most important instrument in 
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maintaining a controlled country. In 1938, Calles’ PNR disappeared to give way 
to a new party ─the PRM, Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, renamed by 
Lázaro Cárdenas after sending Calles into exile; since 1946 it has been known 
as Partido Revolucionario Institucional, the PRI. The initial PNR brought political 
stability to the country in the early years after the Revolution. The so-called party 
of the government, whatever the name used, was capable of capturing the 
Revolutionary principles and exploiting them to rebuild a patriotic atmosphere 
around it. How was the PRI so successful in retaining the power for so many 
years? According to Joel Migdal54 the government’s behavior can be explained 
as follows: there are three types of state policies that underlay the rapid and 
widespread weakening of old social and political arrangements: 
The first one was instituting new models of transportation: this model was 
used by Porfirio Díaz, giving preference to the construction of roads and rail 
networks. During Díaz’ administration the rail network grew 800 percent between 
1876 and 1884, and by 1910 the railroad grid laced the entire country. The 
second type was adopting new forms and procedures of taxation, which didn’t 
change much during the process of the reconstruction. The third and final option 
is effecting important changes in land tenure patterns, which was the main 
philosophy of the revolutionaries prior to, during, and after the Revolution, and 
was eventually adopted by the PRI government. Cárdenas was one of the most 
fervent followers of this policy, although subsequent presidents in México have 
used land reform to bolster the PRI’s power. The slogan gave the party and the 
government the chance of reviving President Juárez’ precepts and use them as a 
symbol of Mexican history. In México, as in almost every other area where land 
tenure changes were introduced, the state rulers offered new regulations as a 
step against the mortmain, that anachronism of feudalism which preserved the 
inalienable right of communal organizations to hold land in perpetuity.55 
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For many years the words PRI and government were synonyms in 
México. The PRI became the state organization and the focal point for hopes of 
achieving broad goals of human dignity, prosperity, and equity; it was to be the 
chisel in the hands of the new sculptors. 
The capabilities of states to achieve these kinds of changes in 
society that their leaders have sought through state planning, 
policies and actions… include the capabilities to penetrate society, 
regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or 
use resources in determined ways. Strong states are those with 
high capacities to complete these tasks.56 
The Revolution gave the PRI those capabilities and it became master of 
controlling the masses. Its domestic policy was focused on enhancing the 
economic development of the country, and establishing strong state institutions 
from health clinics to markets. The president in turn was in permanent touring 
mode, traveling around the country to convey the appearance of a constant 
presence among the population. 
The government through the PRI realized the need to strengthen its 
presence in all areas of the country. Every six years, the government continued 
to fulfill the revolutionary goals in land distribution, visiting the rural areas, and 
promising to resolve all problems. The reconfiguration of the official party and the 
new intuitionalized system for the Mexican government would guarantee peace 
and stability for the next decades. The question of how the PRI was able to stay 
in power finds an answer in a combination of strict party policy, and pacts with 
union leaders. Under the guidance of the president, the PRI made a direct impact  
on Mexican society by embracing the three major sectors of the Mexican 
population: the labor sector (incorporating the major labor confederations and 
industrial unions in the Regional Confederation of Mexican Labor, the CROM, 
which supposedly represented the largest group of organized workers of México 
with the CTM57), the peasants or campesinos (dominated by the National 
Peasant Confederation, the CNC), and the so-called popular sector (consisting of 
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organizations of small landowners, teachers, state employees, etc., loosely 
joined in the National Confederation of Popular Organizations, CNOP).58 The 
good relationship with the country’s most powerful unions was a guarantee of 
“votes” in any election. From this point on the PRI would totally dominate the 
political landscape of México and the president would be the six-year almighty 
leader whose decisions were not to be questioned in any way and should be fully 
supported by the party.  
At the outset of World War II México held back until the day after Pearl 
Harbor when President Avila Camacho, the last general to be president, broke 
relations with the Axis countries in support of the United States. México got 
directly involved in the war after two Mexican oil tankers were torpedoed by U-
boats, officially declaring war on the Axis powers. The country increased in vast 
quantities exportation of strategic metals and minerals to the United States but its 
most significant contribution was the dispatching of some 300,000 Mexican 
workers to the U.S. to replace American farm and industrial workers who had 
joined the military services.59 Relations with the United States were better than 
ever. 
1. Mexican Foreign Policy after World War II 
At the end of World War II the U.S. chose to frame its relations with Latin 
America, including México, in an international security context. There was no 
counterpart to the Marshall Plan in the developing countries of Latin America 
though the Mexican economy continued to grow robustly under the new 
President Miguel Alemán Valdés, the first civilian in decades to be elected 
president of México. 
México got a seat in the newly formed UN Security Council in 1946 for one 
year. México continued to improve the relations with the U.S. and in March 1947 
received the first visit by an American president to México City in the person of 
Harry Truman.60 The situation changed in 1954, when relations were marred by 
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the U.S. intervention in Guatemala to overthrow President Arbenz in a CIA-
supported coup. The CIA’s support was widely denounced in México as being all 
too typical of yanqui interventions of the past.61 The Cuban Revolution was 
another issue where despite the urging of the United States and other Latin 
American neighbors, México refused to vote in favor of several measures taken 
by the Organization of American States (OAS) condemning Cuba and effectively 
expelling it from this important regional body. Within a short time, México found 
itself the only Latin American country maintaining diplomatic relations or even 
regular air links with Cuba. However, the Mexican approach to the Cuban 
situation did not prove to be a serious problem in the U.S.-México relationship.62 
Presidents López Mateos (1958-1964) and Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) 
continued good relations with the United States which was heavily focused on 
the Vietnam War. In 1968 México City was getting ready for the inauguration of 
the XIX Olympic Games (October 12, 1968). The lead up to this event involved a 
tense atmosphere sparked by several violent engagements between students 
from the National University and the Polytechnic Institute against the police. On 
the evening of October 2, violence reached its climax in the Tlatelolco Plaza 
(México City) where approximately 8,000 students staged a peaceful protest 
against the authoritarian actions of the Diaz Ordaz regime and the PRI. The 
Mexican army surrounded the plaza in an attempt to dissipate the meeting. 
However, shooting started and by the end of the day more than 400 students 
were killed or wounded, 2,000 more were incarcerated, and many others 
disappeared forever. What went wrong? Until today there are still doubts about 
what really happened. President Díaz Ordaz publicly accepted full responsibility 
for the actions and since that day the shadow of the massacre of October 1968 
has loomed over the PRI. 
2. The Inconsistencies of Mexican Foreign Policy: Echeverría and 
López Portillo 
In the early 1970s Mexican foreign policy became very proactive but 
incorrectly managed. Leftwing President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) took office 
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under the cloud of the 1968 student massacre of Tlatelolco, during which he had 
been the Secretary of the Interior. After decades of diplomatic passivity, México 
charged into the international spotlight. The leftist causes championed by 
Echeverría included close ties with Cuba, support for the socialist government of 
Chile’s Salvador Allende, and the denouncing of the imperialism of the 
industrialized nations. Echeverría got so involved in the Chilean situation that 
after the international financial community had stopped lending to Chile, he 
traveled to that country to offer a line of credit. He even risked a wave of 
domestic criticism by sending oil and wheat to Chile at a time when México itself 
was not self-sufficient in either product. In addition to these presidential 
decisions, Echeverría also refused to recognize the new Chilean government 
after Allende was overthrown in 1973 by General Pinochet. This non-recognition 
of the new Chilean government, of course, was totally inconsistent with the 
principle of non-intervention and the old Estrada Doctrine.63 Echeverría 
established diplomatic relations with 62 more nations. Critics of Echeverría in 
Mexico pointed out that, in doing so, he was trying to gain the favor of as many 
countries as possible to fulfill his aspirations of obtaining the Nobel Peace Prize 
and of becoming secretary-general of the United Nations. If that is so, he failed 
on both counts.64 
Echeverría’s successor, José López Portillo65 (1976-1982), went even 
further. He totally ignored the foreign policy principles of an earlier era and 
intervened in El Salvador and Nicaragua by allowing guerrillas fighting against 
the two regimes to use Mexican territory and also supplying them with large 
quantities of ammunition.66 He also broke off formal diplomatic relations with the 
Somoza government in Nicaragua. López Portillo, in one of the greatest 
inconsistencies of any Mexican administration, still contended that his foreign 
policy was non-interventionist. And while supporting communist guerrillas in El                                             
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Salvador, López Portillo did refuse to support the communist guerrillas in 
Guatemala. Somewhat hypocritically he said: “México will take no sides in the 
[Guatemala] conflict… it is an internal problem and we view internal affairs in the 
context of non-intervention.”67 
López Portillo exercised what he perceived as a new position of power on 
the international stage using President Carter’s state visit to México to needle 
him about America’s “past deceits” and to warn him against such actions in the 
future.68 Much of López Portillo’s policy was in flagrant violation of Mexican 
foreign policy principles; it was clearer than ever that the foreign policy principles 
could be managed or ignored at the will of the president when convenient. 
3. The Institutionalization of the Foreign Policy Principles and 
President Miguel De la Madrid 
When President De la Madrid (1982-1988) took office the country was 
experiencing serious problems; he had to deal with a terrible economy, internal 
political problems and international inconsistencies, all part of the legacy of 
Echeverría and López Portillo. De la Madrid had to attack all the problems at the 
same time; he started renegotiating the foreign debt, an immediate priority, which 
required lowering the volume of Mexico's Third World rhetoric, which had been 
typical of his two predecessors69 in an effort to regain the confidence of the US. 
In a dramatic opening of the Mexican economy De la Madrid eschewed the 
protectionist, closed policies of the past and brought México into the GATT.70 
México also adopted a much more open policy regarding foreign ownership of 
Mexican enterprises and began to encourage foreign investments.71  
In relations with the U.S. De la Madrid met six times with President 
Reagan, improving relations in each visit. Reagan and De la Madrid eventually 
started giving less weight to Central American matters, and finally ignored them 
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for an emphasis on the bilateral issues of trade and foreign debt.72 De la Madrid 
did manage to bring stability to the Mexican economy and to set the stage for the 
real growth that was to come with his successor. Besides a strong improvement 
in the relationship with the United States, De la Madrid’s most important 
contribution to Mexican foreign policy was that during his administration foreign 
policy principles were finally elevated to constitutional rank. His foreign minister 
Bernardo Sepúlveda was tasked to articulate foreign policy and in 1988 seven 
foreign policy principles were included in Article 89 as follows: 
Article 89: the powers and obligations of the president are the 
following: (Amended by decree published in the Federation Official 
Newspaper on October 25, 1993) 
Subtitle X: Direct foreign policy and conclude international treaties, 
and submit them to the approval of the Senate: In the conducting of 
this policy, the head of the Executive Power will observe the 
following standard principles: self-determination of peoples, non-
intervention, peaceful resolution of disputes, juridical equality of 
states, international cooperation for development, and the struggle 
for international peace and security. (Amended by decree published 
in the Federation Official Newspaper on May 11, 1988.73 
This presupposed that from now on Mexican foreign principles would no 
longer be used at the sole discretion of the president but rather would be 
sanctioned by the Congress. 
Mexican foreign policy can be considered as pragmatic in many ways and 
easily predictable. The Mexican government has assumed a foreign policy that 
has agreed more, in a conjunctural way, to its interests; although this means to 
move away of the foreign principles as seen during Echeverría and López 
Portillo. Nonetheless, the Mexican foreign policy principles evolved in parallel 
with the constitution. The interpretations and misuses given to the principles by  
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each administration are, in theory, no longer possible since their inclusion in the 
Constitution and since the Congress has assumed a more steady compromise 
with the international issues of the country.  
Nevertheless, since their achievement, the principles were established 
based on the historical experience and have reflected, to this day, the peace 
vocation that México always has had. There is no intention to change this 
vocation, but it is essential to understand that the current situation in the 
international environment have changed and México is part of that environment; 
it is impossible to hold an isolationist position with respect to the outside 
especially when thinking about the considerations and present exigencies of 
international security. 
This attitude towards the international affairs appears to have changed 
since the arrival of President Vicente Fox who has define a new strategy for the 
Mexican foreign policy in search of a greater participation in order to cooperate 
with the international community, particularly with the United States. 
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III. THE END OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES’ ERA AND THE 
BEGINNING OF THE NEW ORDER 
After being one of the most successful economies, with a six percent GDP 
during the sixties, and the most stable government of Latin America, México 
entered the 1970s with very little confidence in the government’s capacity to 
manage the country. The moral and political catastrophe of the 1968 Tlateolco 
massacre began the long and painful decline of the PRI as México’s ruling party. 
This political descent was accompanied by a downturn of the economy74 during 
the Echeverría and López Portillo administrations, while President de la Madrid 
could barely stabilize the country, not improving the conditions enough to 
convince the people that the PRI deserved their support. The Mexicans saw with 
displeasure the terrible consequences of letting the PRI-Government act freely 
and its lack of respect for the electoral process, as Sidney Weintraub observes: 
The political unease that México was experiencing was based on 
systematic frustration that was bound to manifest itself under the 
proper circumstances, circumstances that presented themselves 
over three successive administrations, starting with that of 
Echeverría in 1970.75 
This chapter analyzes the challenges faced by the PRI during its last 
stages as ruling party and to see why, after being so successful, it lost control of 
the political environment, surrendering the power to the PAN. This chapter will 
also examine the new approaches of México’s foreign policy and the main 
domestic challenges faced by the Fox administration regarding peacekeeping, as 
well as a quick look comparing Mexican foreign principles and the Charter of the 
UN to forecast the odds for the next administration on this issue. 
A. THE PRI-GOVERNMENT DEBACLE 
The scale of repression during the administrations of President Diaz Ordaz 
and Echeverría generated a new wave of opposition movements, prepared for 
outright confrontation with the state. A full-scale guerilla movement developed in                                             
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the state of Guerrero by 1971, involving five army battalions and 10,000 police. 
Although the movement was broken up the politics in Guerrero remained 
turbulent. William Glade attributes the PRI’s durability to “its extensive 
information network, its appropriation of cherished political symbols (the 
Revolution in particular), and its ability to renew itself constantly.”76 Forced 
circulation of elites has occurred after every six-year presidential administration, 
rather than during the period of any single administration. This practice effectively 
ensured that state agencies have not developed deep internal ties over time.77 
When de la Madrid took office, the country was submerged in a terrible economic 
crisis. The PRI felt the sensation of having arrived at a dangerous limit with 
regards to the stability and viability of their political system and this feeling was 
extended in the political and social mood of the country at the end of 1982. In 
January 1983, high-level government officials were estimating that if it was 
possible to get to the September 1 date for the first annual presidential report 
without a social explosion taking place, the new government could consolidate 
itself and advance its own agenda. The iron-clad presidential control of the party 
in power ─the PRI─ and its extreme dependence on governmental resources 
were such that it was not really a political party but rather part of the structure of 
the federal government.78 
The gathering of so many political errors influenced the PRI’s popularity, 
which started to feel its real decline in 1983 by losing several municipalities to the 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). These elections were understood by the 
government as an indicator that the crisis had effectively arrived at the voting 
booths, and presaged the severe decline of the PRI.79 In 1987 at the peak of the 
political struggle, a fissure in the governing party happened; a handful of PRI 
activists created a political offshoot within the party called the Democratic 
Current. This movement was finally marginalized within the party and later 
abandoned the PRI to establish an independent center-left political force that 
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eventually evolved into today’s Partido de la Revolución Democrática, (PRD).80 It 
was the beginning of the end for the PRI. Between 1982 and 1997 the political 
domination of the PRI went down from an average of 91% to 54%.81 The 
Salinas’s administration entered office in 1988 under a gigantic shadow of 
electoral fraud, which encouraged the opposition to press harder on the 
government. Nonetheless, the political education of Salinas de Gortari was 
grounded in a new vocabulary and buttressed with new concepts. The world had 
changed with the end of the Cold War; the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia fell apart 
just as West and East Germany came together. With changes this remarkable 
occurring elsewhere in the world, president Salinas decided that it was time for 
México, too, to begin marching to a new cadence. He placed México on the cusp 
of becoming post-revolutionary.82 
Salinas’s most remarkable success was NAFTA83 in 1994; but it was 
eclipsed by a wave of violent events such as the Zapatista Revolt in Chiapas 
(January 1994); the assassinations of PRI candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in 
March, 1994 (The most charismatic candidate in decades), and PRI’s national 
leader and ex-brother in law of Salinas, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu 
(September 1994). This was all crowned by an economic crisis at the end of 
Salonas’ period in office. 
The accumulation of so many irregularities in the Salinas government 
worked against the PRI in many ways; however, the death of Luis Donaldo 
Colosio indirectly helped the PRI and its new candidate Ernesto Zedillo by 
influencing the presidential elections of 1994. Zedillo used many of Colosio’s 
phrases during his speeches, making him a martyr. His assassination still 
remains as an unresolved problem. The new President Ernesto Zedillo instantly 
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started to make changes regarding the political relationship between the 
presidency and the party. Clint Smith defines Zedillo’s new attitude as follows: 
President Zedillo from the very beginning of his administration 
sought openly to reduce the awesome power of the presidency… 
Zedillo announced early in his administration that he wanted to 
keep a sana distancia - a safe distance - from the PRI leadership 
and called for a more democratic selection process to choose PRI 
candidates for elective national and state offices.84  
By the spring of 1998 Zedillo appeared to have abandoned the practice of 
presidential selection of the official PRI candidate for the forthcoming presidential 
elections. The political scenario was perfectly set up for a more radical change in 
the Mexican political system, and the presidential election of 2000 would be a 
decisive moment in Mexican history; the result would decide the fate of the PRI. 
It was true that México was a constitutional state, but no opposition party had 
ever taken office as a result of victory in a national election. Brian Hamnett notes: 
The presidential succession was a remarkable transition, which 
took many Mexicans by surprise, the victory of Vicente Fox, from 
the PAN, meant that for the first time in living memory a political 
party other than the PRI (or its predecessors) would be governing 
the country.85  
The PRI’s loss of the presidency elevated President Zedillo to the status of 
el democratizador de México, defending whatever the results of the elections 
totaled; the newly elected president Vicente Fox and the PAN represented the 
end of the PRI-Government and the beginning of a new era in México. 
B. THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA 
The new or post-revolutionary era, actually started with President Salinas 
de Gortari who left little doubt of his position concerning the old concepts of the 
Mexican Revolution. Regardless of the many problems faced by his 
administration, he was the key author of the new post-revolutionary concept 
known as neo-liberalism, an anti-socialist doctrine championing the free market 
by placing stringent limits on all government regulation of economic forces; this 
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would also be the name on the headstone of the revolution’s tomb, putting it in 
such a deep grave that exhumation would be impossible.86 President Zedillo 
followed the same model in his economic and foreign policy enhancing both an 
eye to the United States. One aspect of México’s foreign policy activity has 
undergone substantial change in the 1990s. Under Salinas and Zedillo México 
was more willing to promote its interests by engaging in higher-profile activities in 
Washington, D.C.87 
Despite the dramatic changes that begun under Salinas and Zedillo at the 
level of politics, México’s first presidential election in the new millennium was 
quite unlike anything in national memory. It was the fulcrum of México’s post-
revolutionary experience. Attention was focused on the flamboyant Vicente Fox, 
the candidate of the conservative PAN. Fox, a prosperous rancher, former chief 
executive of Coca-Cola de México, and popular governor of the state of 
Guanajuato, ran an outstanding campaign and won the elections. Michael Meyer 
had said that  
If Salinas and Zedillo had buried the Mexican Revolution by 
abandoning its most revered principles, Vicente Fox’s landmark 
victory put the final nails in the Revolutionary coffin.88 
The new administration brought a breath of fresh air to the country; 
President Fox knew that he had to start doing things not only different from past 
administrations, but also be credible in his actions. As Meyer describes it: 
Fox announced a major offensive against corruption. México’s 
Customs Department was so dishonest that Fox’s newly appointed 
director found [it] necessary to fire almost all of the customs 
supervisors. In 2001 twenty-two notorious drug traffickers were 
arrested. White-collar crime was exposed when five bank 
executives charged with laundering drug money were convicted. 
Former governor of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva, was 
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where he could be tried for cocaine trafficking. In the total scheme 
of things the successes were only a drop in the bucket, but a good 
start had been made on an endemic problem.89 
1. A New Foreign Policy for a New Democracy 
In foreign policy Fox was even more drastic, drafting a totally new scheme 
for the country against many old system concepts. Fox appointed Jorge 
Castañeda Gutman to be his Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the architect of the 
new foreign vision, and whose father held the same office during López Portillo. 
Castañeda defied and broke with the old Estrada Doctrine considered ambiguous 
and obsolete. Castañeda was confident that one main priority of the new 
government was to move away from the old regime practices and mark a new 
position in the international order. He promoted openness and an acceptance of 
criticism from the international community, which was also supported by 
President Fox, and incrementally increased Mexican involvement in foreign 
affairs. Castañeda was the promoter of the non permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council for México. In his enthusiastic sponsorship to make México 
more participative, Castañeda ignited a fire under Mexican foreign policy when 
asked about México’s future involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, 
showing support for the possibility of militarily participation. This was new for 
nearly everyone particularly for many congressmen in México, who were only 
accustomed to military deployments in disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance inside and outside the country. 
The idea of Mexican involvement in peacekeeping was reinforced by UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan during his visit to México City and address to 
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Mexican police participated in ONUSAL, the operation that helped 
the peace process bear fruit in El Salvador. I would like to thank 
you for those contributions, and to express the hope that in the 
future Mexico will join in more such operations, and be an 
even bigger part of our efforts to stem the tide of conflict. 90 
Unfortunately, the events of September 11, 2001 influenced México’s 
foreign agenda and Castañeda himself. He became increasingly frustrated about 
failures to achieve his goals91 and had growing difficulties in his interaction with 
some cabinet members even with President Fox. As a consequence Castañeda 
resigned in January 2003. Nevertheless, peacekeeping was on the table and his 
successor, Luis Ernesto Derbez, continued to push it. Derbez was also part of 
that new generation of politicians that believed the revolutionary times had hit the 
ground and that México was facing a new time. 
With Derbez, the peacekeeping issue became more responsive, and 
knowing that the topic was sensitive he started to manage it with diplomacy, 
making careful statements and referring to Mexican contributions to the UN. 
Derbez has since ruled out the involvement of Mexican military personnel in 
peacekeeping forces but said he would support the use of Mexican medical 
personnel, observers, and police officers in peacekeeping operations. He said 
the Fox administration has conveyed this possibility to Kofi Annan. “[President 
Fox] has clearly stated that we would like to participate in humanitarian efforts,” 
Derbez said during a radio interview. “Our conversations with the secretary-
general are related to how we can provide support services.”92 However, there 
were some problems. During a visit to Spain in May 2004, Derbez openly said  
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that México was considering military participation in peacekeeping and that such 
participation would always be subject to the support of Mexican society; the next 
day while visiting Switzerland President Fox denied what Derbez said: 
…it is not the intention of this government to militarily participate 
whatsoever, even if the UN or any other organization or country 
asked. México is not going to participate militarily in any of these 
cases, and I’m saying this as President of the Republic.93 
It appeared that Fox and Derbez were thinking differently; to make things 
worse UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked the Mexican Senate and 
President Vicente Fox’s administration to consider contributing peacekeeping 
troops to international missions in a request that created strong controversy in 
Mexico. Annan made the request during a visit to Mexico City in early September 
2004 to meet with Mexican government officials and intellectuals and to take part 
in a seminar on democracy in Latin America. Derbez continued pushing on the 
subject, maintaining a clear position about military participation in peacekeeping. 
One year later during an interview on June 30, 2005 he stated: 
…in order to have a bigger possibility and flexibility …[there is] the 
need that México take its responsibility as a country that represents 
the tenth [largest] economy of the world… At this moment it’s 
economically contributing to all these peace missions. Well then, 
that [México] also can take an active role and this doesn’t mean 
send troops to combat… This debate has to be done in our country, 
people needs to understand what we are talking [about] here, that 
this is a Mexican presence with no interventionist activity because it 
could only happen under the approval of the United Nations and 
with a specific request from the corresponding country.94 
Among other things, Derbez justified the need to get more involved in 
peacekeeping not only in the yearly contribution made by México to the UN 
(around 13 million US dollars) but also in Mexican former participations during 
the early years of the UN, and the responsibility of México in the world context.                                             
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The day before Derbez’s interview, his deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Patricia Olamendi, participated in a debate promoted by the Chamber of 
Deputies Foreign Relations Commission; during her inaugural speech Olamendi 
explained that “the intention of the seminar is that legislators know the benefits 
as much as the role that México would play participating in UN peacekeeping 
operations.”95 She also mentioned that México was signatory of several 
international treaties including the non proliferation treaty as well as others and 
said: 
…therefore we [México] had the authority to participate in this kind 
of [peacekeeping] operations… [T]he challenge is to be part of the 
international context in a more active and constant manner, from 
different scenarios and tasks, and above all, end the taboo and 
misunderstanding with regards to this activity.”96  
Olamendi’s statements stirred the waters again, with the result that the 
president’s spokesman refuted her based on the statement made by President 
Fox during his visit to Switzerland in 2004. After the announcement Olamendi left 
a meeting held with representatives of 30 countries and immediately renounced 
his post that same day saying: “I deeply regret the expressions of Ruben Aguilar 
[president’s spokesman]; I deeply regret that he has ignorance in these topics. It 
is not possible to work like this.”97 None of this altered Derbez’s attitude. In July 
2005 he had a meeting with federal deputies and members of the Foreign Affairs 
Commission, where both sides agreed that: 
México ought to participate in peace missions under the command 
of the UN, but in a circumscribed way: humanitarian assistance, 
electoral counseling and reconstruction tasks in nations that have 
required and requested it. The incursion of the country’s Armed 
Forces in combat operations or wars, as well as the establishment 
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of conditioners for their authorization, is a subject that must be first 
discussed by the society as a whole, based on the changes of 
world-wide dynamics.98 
During this same meeting Derbez pointed out that if México eventually 
sends troops to peacekeeping operations, this undoubtedly should be with full 
respect of Mexican foreign principles, particularly non-intervention, indicating that 
the international community has already defined some basic criteria that are 
congruent with Mexican foreign policy, like the non-use of force (unless in self 
defense), and impartiality in relation to the parties in the conflict. Under these 
circumstances there is no interventionism as traditionally conceived. 
The last time the issue was touched on was during the appearance of the 
Secretary of Defense, General Clemente Vega at the Senate National Defense 
Commission (September 2005) during which Senator Dulce María Sauri (PRI) 
asked five long questions (see Appendix B) regarding peacekeeping, to which 
General Vega answered poorly the following: 
…In relation to the blue helmets, I considered that it’s a polarized 
issue. Most staff officers had said that first we have to arrange our 
house and then go to other parts. I can’t deny that we have sent 
people to Canada, England, United States and Argentina for 
training on behalf of the blue helmets… it’s worth it to clarify that is 
very important not to confuse humanitarian tasks with those of the 
blue helmets.99 
Since then the topic has been frozen; nonetheless, the most important 
observation is that the issue is still open for debate. 
2. To Do or Not to Do Peacekeeping 
The issue of peacekeeping is not unfamiliar to México, which has been 
part of the UN Peacekeeping Operations Committee since 1956. In 1947 México 
also sent four military observers overseas for the first time during the UN Special 
Commission to the Balkans, which is considered as the first peacekeeping                                             
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operation.100 In 1949 India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement followed 
by a cease fire supervised by the UN; México contributed with six military 
observers. More recently México sent a police force (1991) to be part of the UN 
Observers Mission to El Salvador and in 1994 the Mexican Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE) signed a Technical Assistance Agreement with the UN, 
participating in 35 assistance missions in 22 countries including East Timor, and 
more recently providing electoral training to Iraqi officials in México City. This 
information provides sufficient evidence that peacekeeping operations and 
México’s collaboration with the UN are anything but new. 
Since the start of the peacekeeping debate in México a number of 
uncertainties have continued to hang over the whole issue. First: whether the 
Mexican people would support sending troops to these operations. Second: the 
implications of the principles on foreign intervention in the Mexican constitution. 
Third: the opinion of top military leaders. The absence of accurate information 
has been an important factor in the whole issue. In the end, the voice of the 
Congress would have the last word acting as representatives of the people and 
as interpreters of the constitution; the military will obey. To have an idea of how 
Mexicans see foreign policy, a comparative study made by Global Views 2004 
discovered that Mexicans are actively aware of the foreign policy of the country:  
Against all expectations, Mexicans are not inwardly focused. They 
are interested in and knowledgeable about what happens beyond 
their borders. [The] Mexican public is quite worried about the state 
of the world and the direction it is taking. However, leaders 
(political, business, and cultural leaders with an interest in world 
affairs and Mexico’s foreign policy) have a less pessimistic view. 
Both leaders and the public reject a reactive engagement in 
international affairs and favor an assertive, proactive foreign policy, 
but they limit Mexico’s activism to those issues that directly affect 
Mexico. Leaders disagree with the government’s foreign policy 
performance, yet the general public supports the government’s 
handling of foreign affairs.101 
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The document also revealed that 64% of the population favored Mexican 
to participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and only 27% opposed them.102 
In this matter it is important to remember that congressmen should represent the 
people’s desires and not those of their party. Most politicians opposed to 
peacekeeping belong to the PRI and the PRD. For instance, in January 2005 
Deputy Jorge Martínez Ramos (PRD) proposed and got approval in the chamber 
“to exhort the Federal Executive to abstain himself to carry on any action related 
to sending Mexican troops in the so-called peace missions.”103 In July of that 
same year, the PRD reiterated that they would reject any request from the 
federal government to allow México to send troops overseas in peacekeeping 
operations. These radical attitudes caused more damage around this sensitive 
topic instead of helping open a debate and find a solution. Both parties defended 
revolutionary principles and the Estrada Doctrine, trying to return to the old 
system where if you don’t mess with other people’s problems nobody will mess 
with yours. However, it is not only the preservation of the old doctrine; rather as 
Laura Zamudio has noted, there is more behind the scenes: 
…[T]he fact that the country was dominated for more than 70 years 
by one single party that held the fallacy of democracy through 
apparent elections…, the concept of sovereignty became an 
important shield to stop possible interventions from the U.S. over 
the national politics to protect the damaged prestige that the 
authoritarian regime of the PRI suffered in the international arena… 
[S]overeignty and self determination helped to avoid that the 
Mexican government suffered interventions from international 
organisms like the UN.104 
Zamudio also favors México’s participation in peacekeeping, saying that it 
would give the country a “more visible role in international affairs without losing 
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its traditional posture of peaceful solution to conflicts;” taking into account that 
peacekeeping is directed to prevent the continuation of conflicts and México, now 
looking for a more active foreign participation, has been a strong advocate of 
peaceful solutions. For many years México has faced a safe, stable, and benign 
regional environment with no immediate security threats, largely because of the 
implicit U.S. security shield it enjoys. This has allowed México to disengage from 
world affairs and to choose when and how to involve itself in them. The Fox 
administration has tried to conciliate this pragmatism and the principles of foreign 
policy, particularly since the September 11 events. Now México has to work more 
closely with the U.S. to ensure a viable security environment that benefits both 
countries, because if México was blessed by the cover of the U.S. before, now it 
is also sleeping under the same insecure blanket. 
3. Navy versus Army versus New Foreign Policy 
Journalist Jorge Carrasco pointed out that the Secretary of National 
Defense, [General] “Clemente Vega, has manifested his opposition to this kind of 
collaboration [peacekeeping] and above all against the eventuality that Mexican 
troops stay under command of an American general.”105 Is General Vega’s main 
concern that Mexican soldiers would be under the command of a U.S. general 
rather than the real political and social implications of the problem? According to 
his statement and assuming that Mexican troops participated in peacekeeping, 
they could be under the command of any foreigner designated by the UN, but not 
an American. 
Regardless of Gen. Vega García’s opinion there are other Mexican military 
leaders that see the benefits of allocating troops to peacekeeping forces. Retired 
Army Gen. Luis Gárfias Magaña said Mexican soldiers would gain from the 
experience of serving under an international command. “This would allow them to 
strengthen their military training,” Gárfias told the Mexico City daily newspaper La 
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Jornada106. Gárfias also said that Annan's proposal for including Mexican troops 
in peacekeeping forces merits further discussion. “This is a matter that should be 
addressed not only by legislators but by members of the military.”107 The 
Mexican Navy has made clear its support to México’s participation in 
peacekeeping as Admiral Marco Antonio Peyrot, Secretary of the Navy, 
restructured the Navy in 2000, creating two naval forces capable of participating 
in multinational peacekeeping operations;108 he also said that “the Navy would 
do whatever the president or Congress ordered, even if it required additional 
equipment or preparation.”109 For the Navy it’s important to exert control of the 
sea and project naval supremacy, which demands an oceanic profile; also “the 
possibility of participating in peacekeeping operations imposes the necessity to 
have capacity to project naval supremacy to great distances.”110 
Furthermore, in August 2004 the Centro de Estudios Superiores 
Navales111 (CESNAV) organized a seminar in peacekeeping operations in 
coordination with the Foreign Affairs Ministry with the participation of 
Congressmen, Army and Navy officers. However, it was during the 2005 seminar 
on peacekeeping organized by the Chamber of Deputies Foreign Relations 
Commission, where the Army and the Navy found the perfect forum to articulate 
their positions about peacekeeping. In her inaugural speech Deputy Secretary 
Olamendi stated that “the simple economic contribution [of México] doesn’t 
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count, because it looks like México won’t make any [real] commitment to peace, 
not participating in PKO.”112 In support the Navy representative said that  
México couldn’t subtract from the process of globalization and that 
other Latin-American countries have seen our country in the past 
as a leader in opinion, action, and foreign policy, they have now 
grown and México has been left behind, stagnant in an old 
posture.113 
On the other hand, the Army (Secretariat of Defense) position was 
reinforced by General Carlos Gaytán Ochoa, Operations Deputy Chief of Staff of 
the Army, maintaining a different perspective indicating that  
The consequence of a possible participation [of México] would be 
to the contrary, meaning the loss of the international prestige of 
México by modifying its traditional posture defending the principle 
of non-intervention.114  
While Olamendi and the Navy representative agreed in several things --
peacekeeping would give the opportunity for special training to the military 
component, the economic benefits for the participants, and the acquisition of new 
equipment); the Army representative argued: 
There are developed countries whose armed forces have the 
mission of expand the dominion of such state, on the other hand, 
Mexican Armed Forces have the fundamental mission of defending 
the country from foreign aggressions and that to participate in PKO 
will mean modified military doctrine, in addition, it would have to 
modify the military doctrine, which establishes that our country can’t 
participate in another country’s war.115 
This comment was answered by a Mexican foreign affairs delegate stating 
that nobody was proposing any changes to military doctrine, and that México’s 
participation would be under the UN sponsorship and not under unilateral or 
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multinational operations against other nations, like the case of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The Army representative had also said: 
…another aspect would be the reciprocity, that is to say, that 
[another country] could insert foreign troops into [our] national 
territory. It also will imply extraordinary expenses of money for the 
annual budget that would affect the internal priorities…116 
He was, again, replied to by another foreign affairs official, denying it and 
stating that reciprocity is no longer in effect and that current peacekeeping 
operations were deployed under specific internal circumstances. The symposium 
was a platform that really showed both Secretariats’ positions. The Secretariat of 
the Navy clearly favors peacekeeping and has what is most important in this 
matter, the will to take the risk in these operations, understanding that it will be a 
slow process but also that it can be no longer postponed. The Navy arguments 
are more focused on the operations itself, lessons to learn, the procedures, 
military and political implications, possible benefits, etc. This attitude is the result 
of more frequent contact with other nations’ armed forces and the experience 
gained from participating in multinational exercises as observers; those exercises 
have demonstrated that the exchange of information, experience and training is 
an invaluable tool for the better performance of the Navy during the execution of 
operations in México. 
The position of the Secretariat of Defense is equally clear in its opposition 
to participation in peacekeeping operations. The disagreements of the Army are 
concentrated in the historic foreign policy principles and the Estrada Doctrine, 
particularly in non-intervention, showing a consistent inclination that reminds us 
of the early post revolutionary years. Another bias exposed as lack of support is 
the one about participating in other countries’ wars, showing a misperception or 
misunderstanding of peacekeeping purposes and missions. The argument that 
México will suffer severe consequences in foreign policy if it gets involved in 
these operations is out of context; México is already suffering the consequences 
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of maintaining an isolationist policy. In essence there is only one fact; the Army 
doesn’t want to get involved in peacekeeping and the Navy does want it. 
4. Mexican Foreign Principles and the UN Charter 
The main argument of those opposed to Mexican involvement in 
peacekeeping is that it is against the foreign principles of the Mexican 
constitution and that this would have severe consequences for the country; in this 
matter it is imperative to see not only the contradictions of the Mexican 
constitution itself but also the similarities that is has with the UN Charter: 
The principles stated in the Mexican Constitution, Article 89 are six and 
are fairly clear: 
Article 89 sub incise X. …In the conducting of this [foreign] policy, 
the head of the Executive Power will observe the following standard 
principles: self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, peaceful 
resolution of disputes, juridical equality of states, international 
cooperation for development, and the struggle for international 
peace and security.117 
The self-determination principle is a concept developed before 1859 and 
it was an ethical and political statement against European colonialism and the 
right of nations to have an equal right to sovereignty which is included in the 
juridical equality of states principle; the UN Charter equivalents are:  
Article 1. No. 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen 
universal peace. And…  
Article 2. No. 1. The Organization is based on the principle of 
sovereign equality of all its Members.”118 
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Non-intervention, as it has been seen, means that it is out of the question 
for México to get involved directly in another country’s problems, unless the 
country itself has asked outside involvement. In this same tone the UN Charter 
says: 
Article 2. No. 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under 
the present Charter. 
The peaceful solution of disputes and the struggle for international 
peace and security are also included in the UN Charter in 
Article 2. No. 3. All Members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
The international cooperation for development is included in 
Article 1. No. 3. To achieve international cooperation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character… 
Among all the similarities, which are obvious, one in particular calls for 
attention in the Mexican Constitution, the last part of Article 89 stating the 
struggle for international peace and security. If this is the case, then 
México’s Constitution is effectively already committed to help maintain 
international peace, and in light of this fact, peacekeeping operations are one of 
the main tools used by the United Nations to preserve international peace; 
therefore México is, according to its own constitution, capable and authorized 
to participate actively in peacekeeping operations. 
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IV. THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES AND THE FUTURE 
 Since the end of the Mexican Revolution the Mexican military has been 
focused on internal security; with the exception of the participation of the Air 
Force 201 Squadron in WWII the army, navy and air force are currently playing a 
significant role in counter narcotic activities, including interdiction and the 
deployment of some 20,000 troops at any one time including disaster relief 
whenever needed. Since the end of the Revolution and even more after WWII 
the Mexican military was characterized by its loyalty to Mexican governments, 
without questioning or getting involved in politics, while other Latin American 
countries were struggling with internal conflicts and military coups. The Navy was 
separated from the Army in 1939 creating the Secretariat of National Defense 
and the Secretariat of the Navy. Since then both entities have assumed similar 
missions: “I. Defend the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the nation” 
and “II. Guarantee internal security”119 for the Secretariat of Defense and “…to 
use the naval power of the federation in the external defense and to contribute in 
the internal security of the country”120 for the Navy. As Wesley Fryer explains: 
An analysis of the ways American nations perceive security threats 
begins with the fundamental raison d’être of every nation’s military: 
the protection of territorial integrity. Many Latin American militaries 
share a common preoccupation with historic border conflicts.121 
 Making their primary role the defense of national territory against possible 
aggression of neighbors, México’s military is a leading example of this mindset; 
focusing on defending the country against foreign incursions has provided the 
basis of their legitimacy as institutions for decades. Nonetheless, it has been 
some years since México’s sovereignty was threatened by its northern neighbor, 
and it is currently hard to believe that it could happen again. This absence of 
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neighboring threats or enemies made the Mexican military look for secondary 
roles where it could be employed in order to justify its presence and the 
allocation of budget; for instance, internal defense, civic action, and counter 
narcotics operations have become part of their regular duties. The Mexican 
Armed Forces, particularly the Army, never considered to be deployed overseas 
in peacekeeping or other operations; now is the time to consider those 
deployments. This chapter analyzes the current situation and capabilities of the 
Mexican Armed Forces as a whole, as well as considers some aspects 
separately. The purpose of this analysis is to discover whether the Mexican 
Armed Forces have the capabilities shown by other Latin American countries that 
have committed their military to UN peacekeeping missions. This analysis will 
demonstrate that the Mexican Armed Forces are eminently capable of 
performing, and will discuss the important advantages that would flow from 
Mexican participation in UN peacekeeping. 
A. ORGANIZATION 
As mentioned before, the Mexican Army (at least 144,000 personnel) and 
Air Force (at least 12,000 personnel) are embedded in the same body known as 
the Secretariat of National Defense; the Navy (at least 44,000 personnel), which 
includes Marines and Naval Aviation, are under a different command known as 
the Secretariat of the Navy. 
Although in the Secretariat of National Defense’s structure the Mexican Air 
Force (FAM122) has its own Commandant (see figure 1 under the name 
Comandancia FAM) the official voice is the Secretary of National Defense, an 
active duty four stars General, who is also acting as Army Commandant. This 
means that the Air Force actually has no independence from the Army; the 
structure is similar to the one the United States had during WWII. The structure 
doesn’t contemplate a Joint Staff either; therefore, the Navy is a separate 
autonomous entity. 
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Figure 1.   Organizational Chart of the Secretariat of National Defense 
 
The Secretariat of the Navy is not dissimilar; although it has a Marine 
component, there is no Marine Commandant; instead, all Marine units are 
included in two Naval Forces (Gulf of México and Pacific) in a brigade level 
Fuerza de Reacción Anfibia de Infantería de Marina (Marine Amphibious 
Reaction Force). Naval aviation is subordinated to Regional Commanders but 
works closely with both Naval Forces.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Organizational Chart of the Secretariat of the Navy 
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In comparison with some Latin American countries México’s GDP is fourth 
in Latin America and first measured in GDI123 and it’s the only Latin American 
country that has been accepted in the Organization of Economic Co-operation 
and Development; however, the Mexican Armed Forces are one of the smallest 
in budget. In 1999, México’s military budget had swelled to 1% of GDP, and 
recently the budget has been expanded to accommodate counter drug 
operations. The inward orientation of the armed forces has contributed to placing 
them as a third or fourth order secretariat in the Mexican government, being 
relegated to a lower status by other priorities such as education, social 
development, and security. 
The development of the armed forces defense policy and its doctrine is 
the result of a long term historical cluster; from this point, missions and tasks are 
perfectly identified and prioritized in order to decide which kind of organization is 
needed to meet the government assigned priorities. However, this doesn’t mean 
that the armed forces have not reacted appropriately to changing circumstances. 
Since the Chiapas uprising (1994), and in light of the continual increase in drug 
trafficking, the armed forces have done as much as possible to contend with new 
requirements and missions. Most of these inputs have been done without any 
major adjustments in structure and equipment. Although both Secretariats are 
autonomous from each other, (a long term issue barely discussed but definitely a 
subject matter that requires more study), it is important to emphasize that both 
organizational structures have been effective in their own fields regardless of the 
tasks assigned and the government requirements. 
B. EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND PROFESSIONALIZATION 
The 1994 Zapatista uprising was a wakeup call not only for the Mexican 
Armed Forces but also for the government, as Díez explains: 
…it provided sound justification for additional funding for 
modernization. This was quickly recognized and taken advantage 
of by the military hierarchy. In addition to significant equipment 
purchases, the institution embarked upon a thorough review of its 
professional development of the officer corps, as well as of its 
                                            
123 Grows Domestic Income. 
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training and organization. Over the period of 10 years, massive 
improvements to barracks and training facilities have been made 
throughout the country, and new courses for Special Forces and 
the Army in low intensity warfare developed.124 
Nonetheless, both secretariats have managed to develop in strength and 
training. For instance, beginning in 1986, the Fuerza de Intervención Rápida 
(Rapid Intervention Force) was created by the Army to provide security during 
the Soccer World Cup in México City. They were trained by the French GIGN 
(Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale) in counter-terrorism tactics 
and special weapons; in 1990 this force became the Grupo Aeromóvil de 
Fuerzas Especiales (Special Forces Airmobile Group, GAFE) and since then the 
Army have created three Special Forces Brigades with nine highly trained 
battalions. Later the GANFE, Special Forces Amphibious Group was formed; 
Jordi Diez’ describes it: 
Most notably, forming, training, equipping and deploying airmobile 
and amphibious Special Forces units/groups (GAFES/GANFES) in 
the war on drugs have been emphasized. These are serious 
soldiers who do well in their internal mission, and compare 
favorably to foreign counterparts.125 
Up to the present the Army Special Forces continue fighting the war 
against drug cartels. They have successfully captured drug leaders such as 
Benjamin Arellano Felix and Osiel Cardenas of the Cartel del Golfo. In this 
regard the Navy also did its part in 2000, creating two Special Operations Forces 
company level units called Fuerzas Especiales (FES); their specialties are 
unconventional warfare, assault, counter-terrorism, kidnapping recovery, and 
special reconnaissance operations. There are also two other Special Forces 
units battalion level called Batallón de Comandos Anfibios (Amphibious 
Commando Battalion), these units carry out special tasks for the Marine 
Amphibious Reaction Forces; they are trained in underwater demolition,  
 
                                            
124 Jordi Díez and Ian Nicholls. Mexcian Armed Forces in Transition. Strategic Studies 
Institute. January 2006. p. 25. 
125 Ibid., p. 23. 
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parachuting, irregular warfare, and urban combat. All these units are assigned to 
the Naval Forces. Each secretariat has its own training process for Special 
Forces and for the regular forces. 
While both secretariats have been dealing with budget restrictions for 
many years they have made some remarkable achievements; for example, 
without any specially assigned funds the Army brought out a new rifle in 2005, 
the FX-05,126 which will replace the old HK G-3, including the capability to build 
all its parts. The Navy instead purchased the M-16 in all its variants for Marine 
units as a basic weapon, and had to stretch its budget to continue buying 
helicopters and building new ships, mainly rapid patrol boats and oceanic patrols, 
as well as the acquisition of bigger ships including two LST USS Newport Class 
and three USS Knox Class Frigates. 
Although the Mexican and U.S. Armies have very little affection for each 
other, at least not as much as the Mexican Navy with its U.S. counterpart and the 
U.S. Coast Guard, the United States influence on the Mexican Armed Forces has 
been unavoidable. Mexican military organization is based on the U.S. model and 
most military training programs incorporated U.S. army/marines field manuals 
and navy procedures. The U.S. IMET program (International Military Education 
and Training) has allowed hundreds of Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force 
officers and NCOs to receive training at different levels in American military 
schools every year. However, 
The most significant changes have been in the field of professional 
development for officers. [In México] Schools and courses were 
developed for all rank levels, with successful completion being a 




                                            
126 Fusil Xiuhcoatl (Fire Serpent in nahuatl language), the 05 refers to the year developed. 
Internet; accesed September 2, 2006 retrieved from 
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=82106. 
127 Jordi Díez and Ian Nicholls. p. 23. 
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In an effort to improve the professional level of personnel, the Mexican 
Armed Forces have made a most noteworthy advancement in human rights 
training and Rules of Engagement (ROE) formulation. This was a directive from 
President Fox, highly preoccupied by the respect for human rights which both 
secretariats had taken very seriously as Díez points out: 
Virtually every course, whether for privates or generals, includes a 
human rights component. For example, many training areas include 
mock-ups of villages where situational exercises assist young 
soldiers in learning what is acceptable conduct and what is not. 
Discussions with human rights organizations show that the number 
of accusations of violations by the military has plummeted, and very 
few of those are found to have substance. ROEs for a variety of 
situations have been established, and it is believed that they have 
resulted in remarkable restraint being shown by young officers and 
soldiers in some very provocative situations, often with media 
cameras rolling, hoping the military will overreact. These 
developments show a high degree of maturation and 
professionalization.128 
These changes are particularly important. The new democratic practices 
that México is experiencing, such as transparency, human rights, gender 
equality, and accountability, are transforming the decision-making process. Some 
of these practices are also supporting points for the peacekeeping argument 
because they translate into professionalism for the force, and peacekeeping 
contingents must have high levels of professionalism. The Mexican soldier is no 
longer the ignorant peasant that joined the Army because he had no other work 
options; now the armed forces have grown, representing not only a work source 
but also a means to achieve preparation and qualification. The advances made 
by the Mexican Armed Forces in the preparation and training of their personnel 
must be counted as real achievements. This professionalized level has changed 
the image of the armed forces in the country, particularly for the Army, which has 
been living with the stigma of 1968 for almost forty years. 
C. MEXICAN MILITARY VS. THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA 
The Mexican Armed Forces have been in a peace-time mode since the 
end of WWII; this situation has made them face new challenges, adapting their 
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tasks to new threats, such as drug trafficking, as mentioned previously. Most 
Latin American countries are facing the same situation; there are no real 
neighboring threats in terms of traditional inter-state warfare. This doesn’t mean 
that the need for armed forces is disappearing as Antonio Pala stated, “The 
armed forces are an integral institution within a state, and the absence of a [clear 
and] present enemy [or external threat] does not invalidate their existence.”129 
The Mexican administration of 2000 changed the view of México towards 
international issues, deciding to assume a more active role; if México is moving 
in the right direction with regards to economic relations and social development 
with the international community what would be the role of the Mexican military? 
Could UN peacekeeping missions provide a viable role for the Mexican Armed 
Forces in the international context? Antonio Pala provides a possible answer. 
In light of the current international environment, several Latin 
American armed forces have incorporated United Nations (UN) 
peace operations as a secondary role within their defense doctrine. 
The Argentine army highlights the support of peace operations as a 
secondary role, along with providing logistical support to combat 
narcotrafficking, providing community support in emergency 
situations, and helping to protect the ecological system.130 
The participation of Latin American countries has increased significantly 
and has been recognized --especially Argentina, which has become an examplar 
model of modern peacekeeping force, as Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN 
undersecretary, stated during an interview. “Argentina has provided hospitals, 
troops, engineers, police, and electoral observers. I wish that all countries would 
participate at this level and diversity.”131 Argentine Army General Carlos Maria 
Zabala, former UN Sector Commander in Croatia, cited many of the advantages 
of peacekeeping for his army: 
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On a professional level, it is an occasion to operate in a complex 
operational environment. You have the opportunity to work with 
other armies and appreciate their capabilities as well as your own. 
It provides first hand knowledge of the effects of war, allowing our 
troops to appreciate the importance of the UN and its peace 
operations. On a personal level, it lends opportunity for travel to 
foreign locations and exposure to other cultures and customs. 
Additionally, it allows the troops to feel as representatives of their 
country in an important mission abroad.132 
Argentina is only one case; currently there are eleven Latin American 
countries involved in peacekeeping --Brazil leading the one in Haiti, Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, Paraguay, etc. with troops and observers 
deployed all around the world. Some of these countries are smaller in size than 
México, in area and population as well as in their economic proficiency. The 
comparison made is not limited to Latin American countries; there are many 
more countries around the world that are helping the UN sending peacekeeping 
troops with fewer resources than México, which means that there are other 
factors involved in deciding whether or not send troops for peacekeeping; other 
than those already mentioned. Throughout the twentieth century many Latin 
American countries faced military coups, including Argentina, developing an 
environment of mistrust in many of those societies. This was not the case for the 
Mexican Armed Forces; despite the crude events where particularly the army has 
been involved most Mexicans consider their military as an honorable institution. 
Participation in UN peacekeeping is an opportunity not only to improve the image 
and prestige of the military domestically and internationally, but also to increase 
the level of training and professionalization, as Deborah Norden observes: 
The military’s participation in peacekeeping allowed the armed 
forces to become a valuable player in the government’s foreign 
policy, bringing praise and recognition, where they had previously 
found disdain.133  
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Peacekeeping is a Military Operation Other Than War; it involves a much 
more humanitarian level of conduct, as Antonio Pala states: 
The protection of innocent civilians in Croatia, the clearing of 
minefields in Cambodia, and the operation of a hospital in 
Mozambique can only enhance their profile at the national and 
international levels. These new roles cannot erase past mistakes 
but can offer the prospect for a better partnership with civilian 
authorities and society.134 
This is the kind of role that the Mexican government and its military 
establishment must look for, which also concurs with the line of international 
cooperation for development, and the struggle for international peace and 
security stated in the constitution. Despite the particular exigencies that any UN 
peacekeeping operation may have concerning equipment, logistic support or 
else, the Mexican Armed Forces have sufficient proficiency to perform in this 
environment; the basic and most important element of any operation is the 
human factor. Time is still running against México while politics and military 
leadership are thinking how to manage the issue; it is time that both parts moved 
faster and decide on the issue; apart from the roles that Mexican Armed Forces 
already have inside the country, peacekeeping is best not only for them but also 
for México. All this must and can be accomplished without changing their primary 
mission because, as Gabriel Marcella put it, “Defense of the nation from external 
enemies is the irreducible sine qua non legitimating function of the armed 
forces,”135 and this mission is undisputable. 
D. A POLITICAL AND/OR MILITARY DECISION 
The posture of the two main Mexican military bodies has been clearly 
described in this chapter. It is also a fact that the final decision of whether México 
will or will not commit its military in peacekeeping operations will be political 
rather than military. Nonetheless, the Mexican Armed Forces have to shift their 
mindset to a broader scenario than only internal commitment. The arguments 
sets out in this paper favor the active participation in peacekeeping operations. 
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From the military perspective, the primary motivation for UN participation should 
be institutional survival or the avoidance of budget reductions. However, there 
are other unintended beneficial consequences that will be promoted, such as 
democratic consolidation, increased professionalism, and international 
recognition. 
Mexico lives today within a scheme of increasing interdependence, and its 
policies are oriented to consolidate that reality. In this sense, one of the leftovers 
that needs to be resolved is to update and to relocate concepts such as non-
intervention because, regardless of the Mexican historical experience and the 
traditional foreign policy adopted by the revolutionaries, the new world 
environment is sweeping the country in a new context. The obvious changes 
made as a consequence of the September 11 events have modified the 
conditions for global security and regional stability, and México has not only a 
geographical obligation, due to its closeness with the U.S., but also an 
international commitment with global security. This is the right time for a change 
in foreign policy. 
México suffered another, perhaps more radial, change in its political 
apparatus; while the new regime peacefully took office, the last six years have 
been lived in a new democratic experience for Mexicans, watching how the 
president is no longer the patron and the many difficulties of having a split 
congress. The Fox administration ended on December 1 this year, and is 
expected that the new President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) from the PAN will 
seek for a continuation in foreign policy, as stated during an interview 
[Mexican] foreign policy has to be a responsible and active policy, a 
policy that sends México into the world. I commit myself to resume 
the leadership of México in the world, in multilateral forums and 
also in the different regions of the world, starting with Latin 
America.136 
President Calderon also stated in his proposals for his administration to 
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…complement actions with the Millennium Objectives proposed by 
the United Nations and incrementing our political participation in 
international organisms, as well as multilateral forums promoting 
the respect for human rights and sustained human development.137  
During a conference to students of the Universidad de las Americas in 
Puebla, Arturo Sarukhán, (Calderon’s Coordinator for International Affairs during 
his campaign) was even more explicit: 
México must play a leadership role in the international system, 
must have weight in the construction of a new set of international 
rules because if we don’t participate, other nations will do it and we 
probably won’t like the result because they certainly are not going 
to take in to account our agenda, nor our interests nor our position 
in the international system.138 
These thoughts are showing that Calderon will continue enhancing 
Mexican foreign policy. The surrounding changes and the continuity of the same 
foreign policy are critical to provide the opportunity in reviewing the 
peacekeeping subject again, and Mexican leadership have to look for an open 
door in the social-political-military environment aimed at procuring active 
participation of the Mexican Armed Forces in international affairs, specifically in 
peacekeeping operations.  
México is still shaping its future under the command of this new 
generation of leaders, and active participation with UN missions will yield 
domestic, regional, and international benefits for México. UN peacekeeping is the 
most feasible option for the Mexican Armed Forces considering that military 
participation in UN peacekeeping serves both political and military objectives. 
México is already behind in the world ranking regarding international security and 
UN peacekeeping missions, which essentially will provide the Mexican Armed 
Forces with an operational environment to exercise a military role, and therefore, 
be an active collaborator, among other things, with international security. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. A FINAL ANALYSIS 
México changed in 2000 with the advent of President Vicente Fox. His 
promotion for the respect of human rights and the opening of México to 
international observers, breaking with the old Estrada Doctrine, has giving him 
the recognition of the international community. This new foreign policy view has 
also proved that the avoidance of getting involved in international issues is no 
longer the best option for México in a global environment and that México can 
not stay aside of the international issues and conflicts. Mexican foreign policy 
principles were very effective in the past setting an exemplary model; however, 
the times have changed and now they are questioned and seen as a restriction 
for the new world order; the principles are not obsoletes however, since they still 
valid and are also included in the UN Charter. Among the six principles stated in 
the Constitution the last part of Article 89: “international cooperation for 
development and the struggle for international peace and security;” is not 
an authorization for México to be involved in international affairs; rather is an 
order to do it, it is a constitutional obligation. 
The analysis of the historical background of México has shown that 
México assumed its foreign policy for defensive purposes and to avoid 
interventionism, this posture also reflected the country’s peaceful vocation. 
Needless is to say that there is no intention to change this peaceful vocation, but 
one thing is certain, México and the world are now facing a different situation 
since the fall of the Berlin wall, such situation became an international crisis since 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks of New York. México’s long standing foreign policy must 
be reviewed; its non-intervention principle has been misinterpreted and misused; 
it is imperative to understand that is almost impossible to hold an isolationist 
position when thinking about present international security exigencies. 
The options for México have been reduced not only to an unavoidable 
need to take part in international matters, especially in security, but also because 
it is nonsense to argue that such a need is unnecessary; México can’t avoid that 
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compromise. México’s geographic situation is now, more than ever, directly 
involved in this subject; the need to cooperate with the international community, 
especially with the United States, has become almost mandatory. 
The new perspective of Mexican foreign policy can not be restricted only 
to economic or social development; rather it has to include military participation 
with the UN as a good beginning. Why go to peacekeeping? Peacekeeping is an 
excellent tool to show commitment with international security and not get directly 
involved in war. Regardless of the differences in the military perspective, Army 
and Navy, they will have to face the final decision in the hands of the Congress. 
During the Fox administration the Secretary of Defense never said that Mexican 
troops were not prepared for this challenge, instead he argued other problems; 
nonetheless, any argument made about whether Mexican military is well 
prepared to participate in peacekeeping is nonsense. The improvements made in 
training and personnel professionalization are guarantee that Mexican military 
can and will perform correctly in such environment; both, Army and Navy have 
been successful performing in disaster relief operations inside and outside the 
country and they permanently carry out routine security operations. The 
Secretary of the Navy has clearly stated that Mexican sailors and Marines are 
ready to face these operations and has tried to impel the participation of the Navy 
proving to be a successful example after sending ships and Marines to help in 
Indonesia and the U.S.; both operations brought pride and recognition to the 
Mexican Navy and the country. 
B. PEACEKEEPING AS THE BEST ANSWER 
Mexican policymakers are looking for a more credible position in the 
international scenario with the will of being more involved in the issues regarding 
international security; peacekeeping is a very strong tool to enhance México’s 
ranking in this matter. The benefits of participating in peacekeeping exposed in 
this work are clear and tangibles, regardless of the risk of having Mexican 
casualties overseas, which is implicit in the military carrier and Mexican military is 
aware of this risk dealing with it on the daily basis; the possible negative impact 
that this might have on the society can be mitigated by the introduction of new 
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criterions that comply with the national and international interests. The new 
posture of the soldier will be more protective than destructive, as Gustav Däniker 
says 
…the soldier’s mission in the twenty-first century will be 
increasingly oriented towards the task of securing a life worth living 
not just for his or her own country but for all nations... Thus the new 
peacekeepers [are expected to] represent, in person, the new 
citizens of the emerging global community rather than the 
particularistic interests of the nation-state or their co-nationals. 
These are the humanitarian warriors or the cosmopolitan 
patriots.139 
The traditional roles for military employment in México don’t need to be 
changed; rather they need to be enhanced and adjusted with others that include 
UN peacekeeping. This can only be done by having the political willingness to 
impel these operations; the strategies used by former Mexican governments 
were fundamental in the defense of national interests, but today those positions 
are a restraint in attaining other benefits for the country and in the development 
of the Mexican Armed Forces. Peacekeeping is not an armed imposition nor and 
invasion, rather it is an operation that involves much more humanitarian 
consciousness to ensure a peaceful negotiation process; therefore there is no 
violation of the self-determination or non-intervention principles; the main 
obstacle for México to participate in peacekeeping is an obsolete political 
mindset. However, the participation of México in peacekeeping is unavoidable, in 
fact, México has let passed too much time in making this decision, and even 
though it might be a difficult process it is important to understand that México’s 
present has become the world’s past. Peacekeeping will help to achieve the 
important role that México is looking for in the international arena. The next years 
will be critical for the new administration of President Felipe Calderon in this 
regards; México is running out of time, the political and military sectors have 
much to do to make this happen. 
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APPENDIX A.  STATEMENT OF THE ESTRADA DOCTRINE (1930) 
“In connection with the changes of government that have taken place in 
certain South American countries, the Mexican Government has, once more, 
found it necessary to decide on application by it of the theory known as 
“recognition” of governments. 
As is well known, México suffered, as few other countries have, a few 
years ago, from the consequences of this doctrine, which leaves to foreign 
governments final adjudgement on the legitimacy of other governments, thus 
bringing about situations in which the legal capacity or the rise to power of 
governments or authorities seems to be subordinated to alien opinions. 
The doctrine of so-called recognition has, since the Great War, been 
applied more particularly to the nations of this continent, while in the case of well 
known changes of regime in European countries, the governments of the nations 
have not expressly granted such recognition, and due to this the practice has 
become a sort of specialty for Latin American Republics. 
After carefully study of the subject, the Mexican Government has sent 
instructions to its ministers or Charges d’Affaires in countries affected by recent 
political crises, to the effect that México does not make any announcement as to 
granting recognition, because she holds this is an offensive practice which, 
besides wounding the sovereignty of other nations, lays them open to have their 
domestic affairs judged in one sense or another by other government, which 
assume a de facto critical attitude when they decide, whether favorable or 
unfavorable, on the legal status of alien regimes. Consequently, the Mexican 
Government confines itself to keeping or withdrawing, whenever it shall deem 
advisable, its Diplomatic Agents, and to continue to accept, also when it shall 
deem it advisable, similar diplomatic agents accredited by such countries to 
México, without judging, either hurriedly or a posteriori, the right of any foreign 




























APPENDIX B.  QUESTIONS MADE BY SENATOR DULCE MARIA 
SAURI (PRI) TO THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
REGARDING PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION OF THE 
MEXICAN ARMED FORCES140 
There has been recently much talking that México must review its role 
about participation in peace missions promoted by the United Nations. It has 
been said that it is an indispensable condition in order to make our country to 
participate as regional power in the world. It is necessary to define the concept of 
peace mission as the United Nations understands it, and in second term, analyze 
the structure of our juridical scheme to valuate the legal possibility of participation 
for the Mexican Armed Forces in peace operations. 
I have four concise questions: 
How can be defined the concept and security doctrine inside and outside, 
and what is the relation of this concept according to fraction X of the 
constitutional article [89] regarding the struggle for peace and international 
security?  
How can these concepts be adjusted over the possibility that our country 
could participate in peace missions promoted by the United Nations?  
In which kinds of peacekeeping missions, military observers, 
reconstruction, consolidation or humanitarian assistance, do you consider that 
military personnel could participate and under what bases?  
Can it be admissible that Mexican Armed Forces stay under the command 
of other countries in the United Nations’ scheme?  
Do you consider that is necessary to fulfill legal holes around this topic by 
incorporating in the constitution the definition of the concept of national security 
and its doctrine, a reform to the Army’s Organic Law, the Air Force or the 
creation of a new law that can regulate Mexican cooperation for peace in the 
international arena? 
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